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PETER N. NEMETZ*

Federal Environmental Regulation
in Canada"
INTRODUCTION

Despite basic similiarities in the environmental problems faced by
Canada and the United States, there are several noteworthy differences
in the structure and operation of the regulatory system for pollution control
in the two nations. In essence, the Canadian system is characterized by
a relatively closed, consensual and consultative approach with a small
number of prosecutions. The evolution of this process has been conditioned by several factors: (1) The narrow decisionmaking framework
which delimits the amount of information which may be available to
environmental interest groups and the general public; (2) the traditional
denial by the courts of class actions and locus standi to all but the most
directly involved participants; (3) an entrenched civil service on the British
model, generally non-politicized except at the most senior levels; (4) the
considerable degree of discretion delegated by federal and provincial
legislatures to regulators, permitting an extensive process of bargaining
with industry in the formulation and implementation of regulations,' and
(5) perhaps most important, a pervasive social phenomenon, born of
historical tradition, which entails a greater acceptance of the legitimacy
and authority of the government to attend to social concerns. This regulatory philosophy and practice stand in contrast to the more litigious
American adversarial pattern with its greater reliance on formal rule
making, review procedures, and broadly mandated pollution control standards.2
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1. See, e.g. W. STANBURY, BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN CANADA: GRAPPLING WITH LEVIATHAN (1986).
2. R. BRICKMAN, S. JASANOFF & T. ILGEN, CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE POLITICS OF REGULATION
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1985); Ilgen, Between Europe and America, Ottawa and the
Provinces: Regulating Toxic Substances in Canada, XI-3 CAN. PUB. POL. 578 (Sept. 1985).
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mental regulation in Canada and notes, where appropriate, contrasts and
similarities with the American system. The conclusions drawn from this
analysis are mixed. First, despite considerable activity of most provincial
governments in the arena of pollution control, it is argued that a continuing
federal presence is required to maintain an effective system of environmental protection. Second, there are certain features of the Canadian
approach which, at least in principle, suggest a potentially higher degree
of economic efficiency and administrative effectiveness than the American
model. Nevertheless, several outstanding issues pertaining to the Canadian situation lead to the conclusion that environmental control remains
imperfect and incomplete, and that a certain degree of circumspection is
warranted before any consideration of transplanting features of the Canadian regulatory model into a significantly different American social and
governmental context.
The following section reviews the structure of environmental regulation
in Canada, and the remainder of the article identifies and discusses seven
issues which bear directly on the assessment of the Canadian system,
particularly in relation to the role of the federal government, and comparisons with the United States.
OVERVIEW OF CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
The ConstitutionalFramework
The framers of Canada's constitution, the Constitution Act of 1867,'
failed, as did their American counterparts of the previous century, to
foresee the significance of environmental problems in their nation's future.
The resolution of air, water, and soil pollution issues has been strongly
influenced by the original allocation of resource and related jurisdiction
between the federal and provincial governments. Statutory authority in
the area of environmental control in Canada has been based largely on
sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act.
Section 91 grants the federal government authority "to make Laws for
the Peace, Order and Good Government of Canada." This clause empowers the federal government to deal with all forms of pollution which
cross provincial boundaries and international borders and to handle special
emergencies such as large-scale escape of poisonous substances to the
environment. 4 Of the powers enumerated in section 91, those associated
3. Originally an act of the British Parliament entitled the British North America Act of 1867, this
act became the Constitution Act when repatriated to Canada in 1982. The Constitution Act is formally
cited as Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), ch. 11.
4. Gibson, ConstitutionalJurisdiction over Environmental Management in Canada, 23 U. TORONTO
L.J. 54 (1973).

Summer 1986]

. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CANADA

with criminal law and commerce appear the most likely to be 'of use in
dealing with hazardous substances and products.'
Section 92 of the Act gives the provinces broad jurisdiction. Provincial
legislatures have authority within their boundaries over such matters as
manufacturing, municipal institutions, property and civil rights, the working environment, and waste disposal. Municipalities are also involved in
protecting the public from certain hazards but, since they are created by
provincial legislation, they act principally as delegates of provincial authority.
Issues of environmental concern may not always coincide with the
division of powers prescribed by the Constitution. A particular pollution
problem may fall within the jurisdiction of both the federal and provincial
levels of government, each of which may view it from a different perspective or choose to adopt differing instruments of control. Whereas the
doctrine of paramountcy provides for the primacy of federal legislation
where conflict arises between statutes of both levels of government, 6 a
reasonably effective modus vivendi has been established by federal and
provincial authorities in the area of environmental control. Generally, a
division of labor has evolved that reduces duplication and which, on the
whole, successfully addresses conventional issues of pollution abatement.
The system is not without potentially serious shortcomings, however, as
will be discussed.
In addition to statutory regulations, the common law retains an important role, at least potentially, in the protection of individuals and the
environment from certain types of hazards. The British common law
tradition is manifested in all provinces except Quebec, which has adopted
the Napoleonic Code in matters of civil litigation. The criminal law,
largely enforced by provincial attorneys-general, is the domain of the
federal government under section 91 of the Constitution Act which states
that "exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends
to . . . the Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal
Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters." Under
section 92, provincial legislatures have jurisdiction over "the Administration of Justice in the Province, including the Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of Provincial Courts, both of Civil and Criminal
Jurisdiction, and including Procedure in Civil Matters in those Courts."
5. Franson & Lucas, The Legal Control of Hazardous Products in Canada, 39 SCIENCE COUNCIL
29
(R. Franson, A. Lucas, L. Giroux & P. Kenniff eds. 1977).
6. A.G. Ont. v. A.G. Can. (Local Prohibition Case) (1896) A.C. 348 at 366; and see discussion
in Franson & Lucas, Introduction in I CANADIAN ENVT'L L., ENVT'L L. COMMENTARIES, DIG. OF
CASES 270-71 (1980).
OF CANADA BACKGROUND STUDY, CANADIAN LAW AND THE CONTROL OF EXPOSURE TO HAZARDS
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Table 1. Principal Statutes for Air and Water Pollution Control in Canada
Government
Canada

Water

Air
Clean Air Act
(S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 47)

Fisheries Act
(R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14)
Canada Water Act
(R.S.C. 1970,c. 5)
(tst Supp.)

Alberta
British Columbia

Clean Air Act
(R.S.A. 1980, c. C-12)

Clean Water Act
(R.S.A. 1980, c. C-13)

Environmental Management Act
(S.B.C. 1980-81,c. 14)
WasteManagement Act
(S.B.C. 1982,c. 41)

Manitoba

Clean Environment Act
(S.M. 1972, c. 76)

New Brunswick

Clean Environment Act
(R.S.N.B. 1973, c. C-6)

Newfoundland

Department of Environment Act
(S. Nfld. 1981,c. 10)

Nova Scotia

Environmental Protection Act
(S.N.S. 1973,c. 6)

Ontario

Environmental Protection Act
(R.S.O. 1980, c. 141)

Prince Edward Island

Environmental Protection Act
(S.P.E.I. 1975,c. 9)

Quebec

Environment Quality Act
(R.S.Q. 1977,c. Q-2)

Saskatchewan

Air Pollution Control Act
(R.S.S. 1978,c. A-17)

Ontario Water
Resources Act
(R.S.O. 1980, c. 361)

Water Resources
Management Act
(R.S.S. 1978, c. W-7)

Table 1 presents a summary listing of the principal federal and provincial
statutes relating to the control of air and water pollution in Canada.
An Outline of Water Pollution Control
While all provinces have statutes specifically addressed to water pollution control, the federal government has played a role in this area
through the Fisheries Act, 7 legislation only partially concerned with environmental issues. Section 33(2) in particular facilitates the federal regulatory presence:
[n]o person shall deposit or permit the deposit of a deleterious substance of any type in water frequented by fish or in any place under
any conditions where such deleterious substance or any other deleterious substance that results from the deposit of such deleterious
substance may enter any such water.
The wording of this section is very broad, encompassing almost any
discharge to water frequented by fish. Although, on superficial examination, the use of the Fisheries Act for pollution control may appear to
7. R.S.C. 1970; c._F-14.
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place excessive emphasis on damage to fish, in fact the Act has been an
instrument for protecting the general environment through the use of the
specifically designated federal constitutional power to deal with seacoast
and inland fisheries.' Section 33(2), in concert with several other sections
concerned with environmental issues,9 is administered by both the federal
Department of the Environment and Department of Fisheries and Oceans.
Under the Act, Environment Canada"0 has developed emission standards
for several major industries in Canada. These standards, incorporated in
Fisheries Act regulations, have been enacted for chlor-alkali plants,"
metal mines, 12 potato processing plants, 3 pulp and paper complexes, 4
meat and poultry product plants, 5 and petroleum refineries.6
In the spirit of federalism, the federal government has delegated to the

provinces some, but not all, of its responsibility for enforcement of the
key environmental sections of.the Fisheries Act. '7 While a direct federal
regulatory presence is felt most strongly in the Pacific and Atlantic regions
of Canada in company with provincial environmental control activities,
other provinces, such as Ontario and Quebec, rely principally on their
own pollution control statutes for the maintenance of desirable levels of
water quality. As listed in Table 1, each province has legislation specifically directed at the control of water pollution. Several provinces, such
as British Columbia, have published standards for effluent and ambient
contaminant concentrations," but these standards are generally unen8. Constitution Act, § 91(12).
9. Section 33(3) concerning logging debris was also used against polluters until it was declared
ultra vires by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1980. Section 33(3) reads:
No person engaging in logging, lumbering, land clearing or other operations shall put
or knowingly permit to be put, any slash, stumps or other debris into any water frequented
by fish or that flows into such water, or on the ice over either such water, or at a place
from which it is likely to be carried into either such water.
10. The federal Department of the Environment is referred to as Environment Canada.
11. C.R.C. 1978, c. 811.
12. Id. at c. 819.
13. Id. at c. 829.
14. Id. at c. 830.
15. Id. at c. 818.
16. Id. at c. 828.
17. See PARISIEN, THE FISHERIES ACT: ORIGINS OF FEDERAL DELEGATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
JURISDICTION TO THE PROVINCES (May 1972). As of 1975, the federal government completed a series
of accords for environmental protection with seven of the ten provinces. Under these accords the
provincial governments agreed to "establish and enforce requirements at least as stringent as the
agreed national baseline requirements." Canada-New Brunswick Accord for the Protection and
Enhancement of Environmental Quality § 12 (Oct. 21, 1975). See also Peter H. Pearse, Turning the
Tide-A New Policy for Canada's Pacific Fisheries 33, a final report to the Comm'n. on Pacific
Fisheries Policy (Sept. 1982); Lynne B. Huestis, Policing Pollution: the Enforcement of Environmental Legislation 47, (June 1984) (Law Reform Comm'n. of Canada working paper).
18. POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, B.C. MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, POLLUTION CONTROL FOR
THE FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (1977); WATER RESOURCES SERVICE, B.C.
DEPT. OF LArDS, FORESTS, AND WATER RESOURCES, REPORT ON POLLUTION CONTROL OBJECTIVES
FOR MUNICIPAL-TYPE WASTE DISCHARGES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA (Sept. 1975); POLLUTION CONTROL
BOARD, B.C. MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT, POLLUTION CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE MINING, SMEL-
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forceable guidelines and the actual process of enforcement is based on
plant-specific permits with site-specific effluent criteria.
The Canada Water Act 9 of 1970, the second major federal statute
related to water quality, differs significantly from the Fisheries Act in
both form and application. Directed less at the control of specific pollutants, this Act is designed to encourage federal-provincial cooperation
in the development of basin-wide water quality management areas. It is
an innovative piece of legislation, directed at the development of integrated pollution control, and it contains provisions for the application of
experimental regulatory arrangements and/or instruments such as effluent
fees. Although Ottawa has negotiated several federal-provincial agreements under Part I of the Act dealing with flood reduction, monitoring,
and survey information, no full scale water quality management areas as
envisaged under Part II have been established. While the Act provides
for unilateral federal action, the central government has refrained from
such a course, presumably because of a hesitancy to place further strains
on the structure of federal-provincial cooperation in the implementation
of environmental control.2 The Act remains a monument to potential but
elusive intergovernmental integrated resource management.
An Outline of Air Pollution Control
The pattern of air pollution jurisdiction and control in Canada differs
in several respects from the system which characterizes the management
of waterborne pollutants. The principal federal legislative instrument is
the Clean Air Act2' of 1971 which, like the Canada Water Act, is cast in
general terms, requiring further specific government action for implementation. The Act gives the federal government the power, under certain
circumstances, to establish maximum limits on emissions from stationary
sources,22 to formulate national air quality objectives," to install and
operate an air pollution monitoring network,24 and to collect and analyze
information relating to air pollutant emissions by industry and other major
AND RELATED INDUSTRIES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (1979); WATER RESOURCES SERVICE, B.C.
DEPT. OF LANDS, FORESTS AND WATER RESOURCES, REPORT ON POLLUTION CONTROL OBJECTIvEs FOR
TING,

FOOD-PROCESSING, AGRICULTURALLY-ORIENTED AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS INDUSTRIES OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA (1980); and WATER RESOURCES SERVICE, B.C. DEPT. OF LANDS, FORESTS AND WATER
RESOURCES, REPORT ON POLLUTION CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE CHEMICAL AND PETROLEUM INDUSTRIES

OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (1980).

19.
20.
1985)
21.
22.
23.
24.

R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.), c. 5.
For a further discussion, see P.H. Pearse & J.W. MacLaren, Currents of Change 72-73 (Sept.
(final report to Inquiry on Federal Water Policy Canada).
S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 47.
Sections 7, 9, 13, 20-21, 21.1, 21.2.
Id.§ 4.
Id.§ 3.
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sources.25 In theory, this legislation suggests a predominant role for the
central government in the control of air pollution, an area which has
received increasing attention because of international concern over the
long-range transport and deposition of sulphur and nitrogen compounds.
In practice, however, the federal role has been largely confined to the
area of information
collection, analysis, and generation rather than en26
forcement.
The federal power to control specific emissions is restricted to circumstances where such pollution would either:
(a) constitute a significant danger to the health of persons, or (b) be
likely to result in a violation of a term or terms of any international
obligation entered into by the Government of Canada relating to the
control or abatement of air pollution in regions adjacent to any international boundary or throughout the world.27
Standards have been developed for chlor-alkali plants,2" asbestos mining
and milling operations, 29 secondary lead smelters, 3" and vinyl chloride
plants.3" In effect, however, site-specific emission regulation remains
almost exclusively the domain of the provinces. Federal activity has been
restricted in part by the failure of any province to formally accept National
Ambient Air Quality Objectives. 32 Such provincial acceptance would permit the implementation of sections 20 and 21 of the Clean Air Act relating
to the application of emission standards to works, undertakings, or businesses in a particular industry or region within a province. 33
Federal activity in the area of air pollution has largely focused on such
activities as the development of "tolerable," "acceptable," and "desirable" guidelines for ambient levels of several major pollutants including
particulates, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, photochemical oxidants, and nitrogen dioxide.34 In addition, however, permissible levels of lead in gasoline are controlled by regulations under the
Clean Air Act,35 and automobile emission standards for hydrocarbons,
25. Id.
26. 20 MINISTERIAL TASK FORCE ON PROGRAM REvIEw (Nielsen Report),
207 (CP32-50-20-1985E) (May 1985).
27. Clean Air Act, supra note 21, at § 7(1).
28. C.R.C. 1978, c. 406.
29. Id. at c. 405.
30. Id. at c. 412.
31. SOR/79-299.
32. E.g., C.R.C. 1978, c. 403 & 404, SOR/78-74.

REGULATORY PROGRAMS

33. SUBCOMMITTEE ON ACID RAIN, CANADA HOUSE OF COMMONS, TIME LOST, A DEMAND FOR
ACTION ON ACID RAIN 51 (1984) [hereinafter cited as TIME LOST].

34. See note 23, supra.
35. C.R.C., Vol. IV, 1978, c. 409.
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carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides 3are
6 prescribed by regulations under
the federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act.
Extensive research has been conducted by the federal government to
establish a comprehensive inventory of air emission sources by pollutant
throughout the nation.37 Complementing these detailed studies are a series
of research documents examining the availability of control technology
by industry.3" In this respect, the federal government has assumed a de
facto staff function for industry and the provinces with respect to air
pollution generation and its control. The central role of the federal government in the collection and dissemination of information is particularly
critical as air pollution can have significant transprovincial and international effects. Indeed, the centralized collection of regional and national
time-series data is indispensable in the evaluation of environmental damage and the formulation of appropriate technological and policy responses.
Nowhere is this conclusion more clear than in the assessment of recent
and projected trends for five major pollutants: carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, particulates, nitrogen oxides, and sulphur oxides.39
First, it is clear that Canadian initiatives in the area of automobile
pollution control have successfully reduced emissions of carbon monoxide
and hydrocarbons in the transportation sector over the last decade.' Such
an achievement would have been very difficult, if not impossible, were
it not for parallel American activities in this regulatory area over the same
period." Indeed, the extent of the Canadian effort has been contentious.
The 1984 report of the House of Commons Subcommittee on Acid Rain
was particularly critical of Canadian standards for NOR, HC, and CO that
36. R.S.C. 1970, c. 26 (lst Supp.).
37. These include: Mercury, 1973; Lead, 1973; Asbestos, 1973; Beryllium, 1973; Vinyl Chloride,
1975; Vanadium, 1975; Manganese, 1975; Fluoride, 1976; Arsenic, 1976; Cadmium, 1976; Zinc,
1976; Selenium, 1977; Benzene, 1979; Copper and Nickel, 1981; and Mercury, 1983.
38. These include: Asphalt Paving, 1974; Cement, 1974; Secondary Lead Smelter, 1975; ChlorAlkali plants, 1975; Arctic Mining, 1976; Internal Combustion Engines, 1976; Asbestos Mining and
Milling, 1976; Packaged Incinerators, 1977; Vinyl Chloride, 1977; Wool Pulping, 1977; Ferrous
Foundries, 1978; Residential Heating Units, 1979; Gold Roasting, 1979; Thermal Power Generation,
1979; Asbestos Manufacturing, 1980; Ferroalloy Production, 1981; Nitrogen and Phosphate Fertilizer,
1982; and Primary Copper, 1982.
39. See a more detailed discussion of this issue in P. NEMETz, C. SMART, I VERTINSKY, P.
VERTINSKY & S. JESSEN, IMPEDIMENTS TO RESOURCE POLICY IN CANADA (UBC Press & Inst. Pub.
Admin. Can., forthcoming).
40. See ENVIRONMENT CANADA Am POLLUTION CONTROL DIRECTORATE, NATIONAL Am QUALITY
TRENDS 1970-77 (April 1979) (Surveillance Rep. EPS 5-AP-78-27); FISHERIES and ENVIRONMENT
CANADA Am POLLUTION CONTROL DIRECTORATE, AMBIENT AIR QUALITY 1970-74 (Feb. 1977) (Surveillance Rep. EPS 5-AP-76-14); ENVIRONMENT CANADA, AUTOMOBILE EMISSION TRENDS IN CANADA
1960-1985 (1973) (Envtl. Impact & Assessment Rep. EPS 8-AP-73-1); ENVIRONMENT CANADA,
NATIONAL URBAN AIR QUALITY TRENDS 1974-81 (Dec. 1981) (Envti. Protection Serv. EPS 7/AP/
14).
41. UNITED STATES COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (USCEQ), ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
1983 318 (1984) (14th Annual Report).
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are three to seven times less restrictive than their American equivalents."
This divergence between national standards was deemed "incomprehensible" by the Subcommittee in light of the integrated North American
automobile market. The strength of the Subcommittee's views may have
led in part to the announcement by the Canadian government in May
1985 of new vehicle emission limits, comparable to current American
standards, to take effect on September 1, 1987."
Second, particulates remain a significant form of pollution in Canada
from a multitude of sources including industrial processes, fuel combustion in stationary sources, transportation, and solid waste incineration.'
Nevertheless, the technology for abatement is generally well established
and not excessively costly for most major emission sources. Third, the
situation with respect to sulphur and nitrogen oxides, the principal precursors of acidic precipitation, is more uncertain and complex. While
national SO, emissions largely decreased in the last decade, there is
concern that increasing use of coal for electricity production in both
Canada and the United States could reverse this trend and pose a major
threat to the environment.4 5 Technological control of these emissions
involves significant capital and operating expenses.
Nitrogen oxides, long ignored as a potential pollutant, have assumed
an increasing importance in environmental degradation because of technological changes and growth in thermal power production and the transportation sector. A Parliamentary report on acid rain predicted a possible
increase in NO, emissions of between 60 and 100 percent over the next
42. TIME LOST, supra note 33, at 12-18. Current standards in grams per vehicle mile are as
follows: NO.: Canada 3.1, U.S. 1.0; HC: Canada 2.0, U.S. 0.41; and CO: Canada 25.0, U.S. 3.4.
For further information on the evolution of U.S. standards since 1968, see USCEQ 1984, supra
note 41.
43. CCH Canadian Ltd., Tighter Emission Control Standardsfor New CarsAnnounced, 292 Can.
Envt'l Control Newsletter 2423 (May 16, 1985); More Stringent Emission Standardsfor Vehicles,
316 CAN ENvT'L CONTROL NEWSLETTER 2615 (May 15, 1986).
44. ENVIRONMENT CANADA, A NATIONWIDE INVENTORY OF EMISSIONS OF AIR CONTAMINANTS 1978
(Dec. 1983) (Rep. EPS 3-EP-83-10).
45. See, e.g., Report of the Subcommittee on Acid Rain of the Standing Committee on Fisheries
and Forestry, House of Commons, Still Waters, the Chilling Reality ofAcid Rain (1981) [hereinafter
cited as Still Waters]; TIME LOST, supra note 33; COMM. ON THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE BIOSPHERE,
NATIONAL RESEARCH

COUNCIL, ATMOSPHERE-BIOSPHERE INTERACTIONS: TOWARD A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING OF THE ECOLOGICAL CNSEQUENCES OF FOSSIL FUEL COMBUSTION (1981); COMM. ON
ATMOSPHERIC TRANSPORT AND CHEMICAL TRANSFORMATION IN ACID PRECIPITATION, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACID DEPOSITION: ATMOSPHERIC PROCESSES IN EASTERN NORTH AMERICA (1983);
UNITED STATES-CANADA MEMORANDUM OF INTENT ON TRANSBOUNDRY AIR POLLUTION FINAL REPORT,

EMISSIONS, COSTS, AND ENGINEERING ASSSSMENT WORK GROUP 3B (June 1982); Acidic Pollution
May be on the Rise, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1985 at A23(L) col. 1; and Canada Will be Hit with
Acid Rain Rise, U.S. Report Shows, Globe & Mail, Mar. 11, 1986 at Al, col. 3. See also ICF Inc.,
Analysis of 6 and 8 Million Ton and 30 Year/NSPS and 30 Year 1.2 lb. Sulfur Dioxide Emission
Reduction Cases, report prepared for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C.,

(Feb. 1986).
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two decades if no further control actions were initiated. 6 The anthropogenic emissions of nitrogen oxides in Canada have reached the same
order of magnitude as emissions from natural sources, while man-made
releases 47
of sulphur oxides are significantly higher than their natural counterparts.
In sum, the actual enforcement of air pollution control rests principally
with provincial pollution control agencies exercising specific provincial
statutory authority. This regulatory control is implemented through a
variety of enforcement systems which are somewhat analogous to the
provincial frameworks for water pollution abatement. British Columbia
(B.C.) has established a permit system which specifies several control
levels for industrial operations and/or processes. Economic theory suggests that this process- or stack-specific regulatory system is economically
inefficient. Recent American experimentation with more efficient, air pollution "bubble," regulatory control systems and tradeable emission rights
are relatively unknown in Canada. 48
British Columbia has established a semi-bubble control strategy for the
massive lead-zinc smelter at Trail where plant-wide, sulphur oxide abatement procedures are tied to a network of ambient monitors downwind
from the smelter complex. The innovative control system adopted at Trail
is a direct result of a landmark international pollution dispute between
Canada and the United States in the early 20th century.49 Most of the
other provinces have either a permit or approval system for air pollution
management supplemented by control or stop orders to prevent excessive
pollutant release once an emission source is in operation.
Other Major Environmental Legislation
In many respects, most of the environmental statutes in Canada were
designed to control the traditional forms of water pollution including
46. Still Waters, supra note 45. For similar concerns in the United States, see also N.Y. Times,
supra note 45; Globe and Mail, supra note 45; and Environmental Protection Agency, Control of
Air Pollution from New Motor Vehicles and New Motor Vehicle Engines: Gaseous Emission and
Particulate Emission Regulations Pt. III, 50 U.S. Fed. Reg. 10,606-708 (1985)
47. See ENVIRONMENT CANADA, NATIONAL INVENTORY OF NATURAL SOURCES AND EMISSIONS OF
SULPHUR COMPOUNDS (Jan. 1980); ENVIRONMENT CANADA, NATIONAL INVENTORY OF NATURAL SOURCESAND EMISSIONS OF NITROGEN COMPOUNDS (Jan. 1981); ENVIRONMENT CANADA, A NATIONWIDE
INVENTORY OF EMISSIONS OF AIR CONTAMINANTS 1978 (Dec. 1983) (Rep. EPS 3-EP-83-10).
48. See, e.g., 1-3 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE CONTROLLED TRADER
(Nov. 1981); UNIrED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EMISSION REDUCTION BANKING
& TRADING PROJECr, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (Sth ed. Oct. 1980); OFFICE OF POLICY AND RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CONTROLLED TRADING: How
TO REDUCE THE COST OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL (Aug. 1981); RA. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFFSETS:
TRADING, SELLING, AND BANKING (1980).

49. See Murray, The Trail Smelter Case: InternationalAir Pollution in the Columbia Valley, 15
B.C. STUDIES 68 (Autumn 1972).
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suspended solids, biochemical oxygen demand, fecal coliform, and heavy
metals, and air pollutants such as particulates, sulphur compounds, carbon
monoxide, and hydrocarbons. While much of this legislation is sufficiently
flexible to address many of the modem environmentl concerns, it provides
incomplete coverage for some of the more exotic contaminants and complex disposal problems.
One of the principal federal responses to the challenge posed by these
non-traditional pollutants was the passage of the Environmental Contaminants Act5" of 1975, specifically designed to deal with "new" and exotic
environmental threats which had largely escaped the purview of earlier
environmental laws. The Act is jointly administered by the federal Ministers of the Environment and of National Health and Welfare.51 Where
the Ministers have reason to believe that a substance may enter the environment in quantities or concentrations that may constitute a danger to
human health or the environment, they are authorized to: (1) require
commercial producers of that substance or class of substances to notify
the government of such activities and provide information about the substances; and (2) require producers and importers of the substance, or any
product containing it, to conduct any tests which the ministers may reasonably require. 52
The Act also requires that a person manufacturing or importing for the
first time a chemical compound in excess of 500 kg must, within three
months, notify the government of the name of the compound, the quantity
manufactured or imported during that year, and of any information in his
possession about any danger to human health or to the environment posed
by the compound. 53 The federal government is empowered, after a somewhat lengthy process of review and consultation, to establish specific
regulations under the Act. Broad powers of inspection and seizure are
available to ensure that regulations are obeyed. In emergency situations,
the lengthy review process may be suspended, enabling federal authorities
to undertake immediate regulatory action."
A more recent federal statute, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods
Act55 of 1980, specifically addresses the increasing problem of public
safety associated with the movement of hazardous commodities in and
around urban areas and across the international border with the United
States. 56 The classes of goods covered by the Act include: explosives;
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Environmental Contaminants Act of 1975, S.C. 1974-75, c. 72.
Id. at §6.
Id.at §4(l).
Id.at §4(6).
Id.at § 7(3).
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act of 1980, S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 36.
Id. at §§3(l) & (2).
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compressed, refrigerated liquefied, or dissolved gases; flammable and
combustible liquids; flammable solids, oxidizing substances; poisonous
(toxic) and infectious substances; radioactive materials; and corrosives."
The Act provides for the inspection of dangerous goods and, in the event
of an infraction, includes provisions for seizure, removal, or forfeiture
of goods,5 8 and recovery of costs59 resulting from emergency threats to
public safety. Major substances exempted from the Act are oil and gas
transported by pipeline, and goods transported in bulk. 6
Protection from hazards in the workplace is mainly the object of provincial jurisdiction and all provinces have enacted industrial safety legislation. 6' The federal government has also legislated in this area through
ordinances for the northern territories.62 In addition, federal legislation
in the field of workplace control applies to organizations under the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada, and in the area of radiation protection through the Atomic Energy Act Regulations.63
A plethora of legislation has been enacted in Canada bearing on the
protection of individuals in a wide range of activities. These include the
federal Food and Drug Act,' Hazardous Products Act," provincial public
health acts, and federal and provincial motor vehicle safety legislation.'
Safety issues associated with other forms of transportation, including air,
rail, and coastal shipping, are also covered by the federal regulatory
umbrella under the Canada Shipping Act, 67 Railway Act,6" Northern Inland Waters Act,69 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 7" and Navigable Waters Protection Act. 7'
Another element of the formal legal system in Canada for environmental control concerns the country's international obligations. One of
the most important of these is the Boundary Waters Treaty72 of 1909 that
provided for the establishment of the International Joint Commission
57. Id. at Schedule.
58. Id.at § 15.
59. Id.at § 18.
60. Id.at §§ 3(3), (4), (5), & (6).
61. Franson & Lucas, supra note 5.
62. E.g., The Pesticide Ordinance, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. P-4; The Public Health Ordinance,
R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. P-10; the Petroleum Products Ordinance, R.O.N.W.T. 1974, c. P-5 for the
Northwest Territories; and the Public Health Statute, R.S.Y.T. 1971, c. P-8 for the Yukon Territory.
63. R.S.C. 1970, c. A-19.
64. R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27.
65. R.S.C. 1970, c. H-3.
66. For example, the federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 26 (1st Supp.).
67. R.S.C. 1970, c. S-9.
68. R.S.C. 1970, c. R-2.
69. R.S.C. 1970 c. 28 (1st Supp.).
70. R.S.C. 1970, c. 2 (lst Supp.).
71. R.S.C. 1970, c. N-19.
72. TS 548: 36 Stat. 2448.
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(IJC). 7 The IJC is a permanent intergovernmental advisory body consisting of three members appointed by Canada and three by the United
States. Article IV of the Treaty stipulates that: "boundary waters and
waters flowing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side
to the injury of health and property on the other."
The Commission is asked by both governments, from time to time, to
examine and report on any questions or matters of difference concerning
their obligations to each other. The IJC has carried out several water
pollution investigations concerning the Great Lakes, St. Croix River,
Rainy River, and Red River, and has also been active in the air pollution
field with the Trail Smelter Tribunal and the Windsor-Detroit investigations.
In 1972, the governments of Canada and the United States entered into
an Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality. 74 A more recent agreement
was signed on November 22, 1978 where both countries agreed that: "the
discharge of toxic substances in toxic amounts be prohibited and that the
discharge of any or all persistent substances be virtually eliminated." 75
In addition to being a general policy statement, the agreement also details
specific international objectives which represent minimum levels of water
quality desired in the boundary waters of the Great Lakes system. 76 These
minimum objectives are not intended, however, to prevent the establishment of more stringent national requirements .7' The IJC and the parties
to the agreement are charged with the task of periodically reviewing the
specific objectives and making appropriate recommendations. Canada
and the United States have the responsibility of developing requirements
in their respective jurisdictions which shall be consistent with the achievement of both the general and specific objectives of the agreement.79
In sum, if one examines the maze of laws and regulations in Canada,
one may be lulled into a misleading sense of security that Canadians and
their environment are adequately protected; some may even argue overprotected. It is important to note that the Canadian system of government
frequently produces strong enabling acts that form the basis for the tempered use of delegated powers by the administrative branches of government. In this system there are two factors which determine the effective
degree of protection from hazards: the nature of the regulation-making
process itself, and the enforcement and extent of compliance.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Article III.
T.I.A.S. 7312, 7747, 23 U.S.T. 301; 24 U.S.T. 2268.
U.S.T. 30.2.1383; T.I.A.S. 9257. Quotation is from Article 11(a).
Article IV.
Article IV 1(a).
Article IV 2.
Article V 1.
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The System of Standard Setting and Enforcement
In drawing comparisons between Canadian and American regulatory
systems for environmental control, two factors in particular must be
recognized that profoundly affect the Canadian process of standard setting
and enforcement. The first is the historical context of the development
of Canada's political institutions and processes patterned largely on and
influenced by the British model. While government is perceived as having
a larger legitimate presence in the social and economic system than it
does in the United States, there is also a significant pattern of accommodation with the private sector in the regulatory process.80 On the whole,
the Canadian system of environmental regulation is much less adversarial
than its American counterpart, and is characterized by an extensive system
of consultation and negotiation in both standard setting and enforcement
activities.8" Another important difference between the two major North
American systems is the significantly lower level of public participation
in this process in Canada. The relative paucity of public input raises
important issues of effectiveness and legitimacy which will be addressed
later.
Extensive consultation is undertaken with industry in Canada in the
formulation of environmental standards at both the federal and provincial
levels of government. More importantly, the actual practice of enforcement is frequently characterized less by the laying of charges than by a
negotiating or bargaining process with industry in order to induce future
compliance.82 Aside from the political and historical context which tends
to condition this type of response to environmental control issues, there
is a second and equally compelling reason for the Canadian enforcement
model. There is a greater consciousness and/or sensitivity to the limited
pool of resources available for any regulatory activity in a country with
a relatively small population and marked by vast distances and geographic
and climatic contrasts. Industry, in many respects, has been considered
a working partner in environmental regulation through the provision of
advice on technological and economic issues and information concerning
water and airborne emissions. The philosophical rationale for this accommodation appears reasonable, at least superficially. Industry is in the
best position to gauge the feasibility and effectiveness of various control
options and to monitor pollutant generation and release. With constraints
80. For an excellent discussion of the Canadian approach, see STANBURY, supra note 1.
81. See, e.g., B.J. BARTON, R.T. FRANSON &A.R. THOMPSON, ACONTRACT MODEL FOR POLLUTION
CONTROL (1984); A.R. THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CANADA: AN ASSESSMENT OF
THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1980); 2 ROYAL COMMISSION ON THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT
PROSPECTS FOR CANADA, REPORT 514

(1985)

82. See, e.g., Kernaghan Webb, Industrial Water Pollution Control and Environmental Protection
Service (May 1983) (draft paper, Law Reform Commission of Canada).

Summer 1986]

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CANADA

on the resources available for government enforcement and follow-up
assessment, the cooperation of industry in all phases of the environmental
regulatory process seems essential in order to guarantee compliance. This
regulatory system is clearly appealing to industry for many obvious reasons, not least of which is some sense of control over the regulations
which ultimately bear upon its operations.
The implementation of this type of consultative regulatory system in
the face of significant resource constraints is not without costs. The
credibility of government efforts to provide protection from environmental
hazards may be compromised in the public eye by the close relationship
between regulator and regulatee. The apparent bias toward industry input
in the standard setting and evaluation phases is of considerable concern
to environmental groups attempting to influence the regulatory process.
Finally, the generally accommodating nature of the government-industry
relationship may hamper the ability of government to act expeditiously
and decisively when faced with significant hazards to public safety and
health. Clearly, the capacity of government to act as an objective and
effective regulator of the environment is a moot question and an elaboration of some of the outstanding issues in Canadian environmental regulatory policy and practice is required before conclusions can be drawn
concerning efficiency and effectiveness.
SOME OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION
At least seven issues bear directly on the assessment of the Canadian
environmental regulatory system, particularly in relation to its American
counterpart: (1) enforcement; (2) potential overlap and duplication of
federal and provincial legislation; (3) the nature of liability; (4) the role
of public input; (5) lacunae in the coverage of the current regulatory
structure; (6) international matters including issues such as acid rain; and
(7) costs and benefits of control.
Issues of Enforcement
One would not expect a regulatory framework characterized by bargaining between regulator and regulatee to be marked by a large number
of prosecutions. The existence of extensive legal action would signal the
malfunctioning of a consultative system. Yet penalties and enforcement
mechanisms must exist in order to lend credence to the capacity and
willingness of government to achieve the goals of environmental protection.
As would be expected, the attitudes of the different interest groups in
Canada vary markedly with respect to the capacity of government to act
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Table 2. Penalty Structure of Major Canadian Environmental Legislation (1984)
Maximum Penalties
Offence
Subsequn
Offence
First
Government

Act

$

Imprisonent

$

Impriornt

$2000

12 mo

Daya
Separate
Offence

Description

federal

CanadaWater Act

$5000

federal

Fisheries Act (pre 1977)

$1000

federal

Fisheries Act (post 1977)

$50000

federal

Fisheries Act (post 1977)

$5000

federal

Clean Air Act

$200000

federal

Environmental Contaminants Act

$100000

2 yr

federal

Transportation of Dangerous
Goods Act

$50000

2 yr

Alberta

Clean Water Act

$50000/d

12 mo

violation of stop order

Alberta

Clean Air Act

$10000/d

12 mo

violation of stop order

Alberta

Clean Air Act

$25000/d

3 mo

B.C.

Pollution Control Act
(supeeceded)

$10000
+ $500/d

B.C.

Environmental Management Act

$100000/d

B.C.

WasteManagement Act

$5O00O

Manitoba

Clean Environment Act

$500/d

Manitoba

Clean Environment Act

$5000/d

corporations

New Branswick

Clean Environment Act

$500

individuals

New Branswick

Clean Environment Act

$5000

Newfoundland

Dept. of Environment Act

$100

Newfoundland

Dept. of Environment Act

$10000

Nova Scotia

Environmental Protection Act

$5000 +
$ 10000/d

Ontario

Environmental Protection Act

$25000/d

Ontario

Water Resources Act

$5000/d

P.E.I.

Environmental Protection Act

$5000+
$ 1000/d

X
6 mo

$100000
2 yr

33(2)
X

$10000
$200000

33(2)
31, 33(l), 33(3)

X
X

general penalty

individuals

corporations
6 mo

individuals
corporations

$50000/d
$10000/d
90 d

Quebec

Environmental Quality Act

$1000

$20000

Quebec

Environmental Quality Act

$50000

$100000

Saskatchewan

Air Pollution Control Act

$500+
$50/d

individuals

Saskatchewan

Air Pollution Control Act

$5000 +
$500/d

corporations

Saskatchewan

Water Resources Management
Act

$100+
$25/d

$500+
$50/d

individuals

Saskatchewan

Water ResourcesManagement
Act

$1000+
$250/d

$5000 +
$500/d

corporations

X

individuals
corporations

in resolving environmental issues. Two major concerns of environmental
interest groups have been the mandated level of monetary penalties and
the number of prosecutions undertaken by the federal and provincial
governments. Table 2 lists the penalty structure associated with current
major Canadian environmental legislation. The severity of Canadian environmental penalties varies markedly by jurisdiction from a maximum
of $500 to $500,000 per offense. The lower end of the penalty spectrum
has elicited criticism from environmental lobbies for establishing an in-
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Table 3. Some Federal U.S. Pollution Control Penalties (maximum values)
Act

Penalties

Clean Water Act

criminal penalties:
1st conviction, $25,000/day and/or I yr.imprisonment
2nd conviction, $50,000/day and/or 2 yrs. imprisonment
civil
penalties: $10,000/day
Oil & Hazardous Substances Liability
$25,000 maximum penalty
liability for actual cost of removal: $50,000,000

Clean Air Act

$25,000/day and/or I yr. imprisonment
repeatedoffenses, $50,000/day and/or 2 yrs. imprisonment

Toxic Substances
Control Act

criminal penalities:
$25,000/day and/or I yr.imprisonment
civil penalties: $25,000/day

expensive de facto statutory license to pollute. While Canadian federal
fines are generally comparable to American federal penalties, as illustrated
in Table 3, it is unclear whether the upper range of most provincial
financial sanctions could, if employed, represent a significant disincentive
for environmental degradation. One of the highest penalties, that of $200,000
per offense, is associated with the federal Clean Air Act, legislation which
until now has played a relatively minor role in the control of air pollutant
emissions.
An assessment of the effectiveness of the penalty structure associated
with environmental regulation in Canada cannot be made without data
pertaining to the number and disposition of legal actions brought by the
various governments. A summary of prosecutions under sections 33(2)
and (3) of the Federal Fisheries Act,83 is presented in Tables 4 and 5; a
provincial summary is provided in Table 6; and an industry summary in
Table 7.
The data have been divided into two time periods, reflecting a shift in
federal policy and data availability. An important landmark is the series
of environmental protection Accords84 signed by the federal government
and seven of the provinces. The federal delegation of significant enforcement authority to the provinces has raised considerable concern in light
of perceived "discrepancies in the nature of enforcement responses across
Canada" 5 and prompted a major research study by the Law Reform
83. This type of information, although available to government, is difficult to obtain because of
geographic dispersion and incomplete record keeping, The author has been able togather, with the
cooperation of the B.C. Ministry of Environment and the federal departments of Environment and
Fisheries and Oceans, data on environmentally-related prosecutions under the federal Fisheries Act
in the past decade. Section 33(3) was declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court of Canada in Regina
v. Fowler [1980] 2 R.C.S. 213.
84. See note 17, supra.
85. Lynn Heustis, Policing Pollution: the Enforcement of Environmental Legislation 77 (June
1984) (draft paper, Law Reform Commission of Canada).

568

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

Table 4a. Canada-wide Prosecutions under Fisheries Act, §33(2)* 1970-76

Year
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
Total

No.
Actions

Acquitted,
Dismissed,
Withdrawn

6
15
15
25
23
14
14

1
2
4
4
3
2
I

110

17

Fines
?

No.

Min.

Avg.

1
1
1
2
3

5
13
10
20
19
t0
10

$100
5
25
100
50
250
50

$1820
2166
1518
1250
1303
1550
1070

Max.
$5000
7500
3500
3000
8200
4500
2500

86

*Section 33(2) deposit of deleterious substances
prohibited.
?Data are incomplete.

Table 4b. Pacific Region Prosecutions by Federal Authorities under the Fisheries Act, §33(2) 1977-82

Year

No.
Actions

Acquitted,
Dismissed,
Withdrawn

1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982

6
16
12
19
18
17

3
9
7
8
4
6

Total

88

37

Fines
?

I
2
2
4

No.
3
6
5
9
12
7

Min.
$150
25
t00
250
100
50

Avg.
$ 2467
20646
6270
16228
23321
7000

Max.
$ 7000
120000
25000
120000
140000
21500

42

Table 5a. Canada-wide Prosecutions under Fisheries Act, §33(3)* 1970-76

Year

No.
Actions

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

26
18
6
6
10
11
10

Total

90

Acquitted,
Dismissed,
Withdrawn
5
5
3
4
3
1
1

Fines
?

1
2

22

No.
21
13
3
5
6
8
9

Min.

Avg.

$ 25
100
100
10
100
50
100

$ 308
1088
367
220
358
347
550

Max.
$1500
5000,
500
500
1000
1500
1000

65

*Section 33(3) slashstumps, etc., prohibited.
?Data are incomplete.
a. This fine of $5000 is counted twice, once under §33(2) andonce under §33(3) becauseof an ambiguity in the records.

Table 5b. Pacific Region Prosecutions by Federal Authorities under the Fisheries Act. § 33(3) 1977-80*

Year

No.
Actions

Acquitted,
Dismissed,
Withdrawn

1977
1978
1979
1980

6
10
12
I

3
7
I

Total

29

I1

*Declared ultra vires in 1980.-

Fines
?
1
4
I

No.
5
3
4
0
12

Min.
$ 50
100
250
0

Avg.
$ 125
500
3375
0

Max.
$

200
1200
12000
0
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Table 6. Environmental-related Prosecutions under the Federal Fisheries Act by Province,
1970
Alberta
B.C.
Manitoba
New Brunswick
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia
Ontario
P.E.
Quebec
Saskatchewan
N.W.T.
Yukon

n.a.
31

1971
I (Inc.)
26
0
1
0
n.a.

2
0
I
n.a.
0
0
3

1972

1973

1974

1975

1
17

3
26

2
24

0?
17

-

0
0
0
na.
1
0
0

1
0

-

2
3
0
n.a.
0
1
0

I

I
0
-

1970-76
1976

19
-

0
0
2
I

0
2
1
n.a.
I
2
0

1
0
I
I
-

0

0
-

1
2

0
1

n.a. = not available.
Inc.-incomplete.
*includes prosecutions under: §30, destruction of fish; §33, injury to fishing grounds and pollution of waters; §33(2) deposit of
deleterious substances
prohibited; and §33(3) slash, stumps, etc., prohibited.

Table 7a. Canada-wide Environmental Prosecutions under the Fisheries Act by Industry, 1970-76

Industry

No.

Min.

Avg.

Max.

I
13
51
12
5
11
24
36
55

1
11
36
10
4
9
20
25
42

$100
500
10
100
5
500
100
100
25

$ 100
3382
212
795
58
2667
1275
664
920

$ 100
8200
1000
2000
100
5000
3500
2500
3500

208

158

5

999

8200

Municipal
Mining
Individuals
Energy
Farms
Pulp & paper
General forestry
Logging
Misc.
Total

Fines

No.
Prosecutions

Total
$

100
37200
7622
7950
230
24000
25500
16600
38625

$157827

-Some of theseare probably logging related.

Table 7b. Pacific Region Environmental Prosecutions by Federal Authorities under the Fisheries Act by Industry, 1977-82

Industry
Municipal
Mining
Individuals
Energy
Farms
Pulp & paper
General forestry
Logging
Misc.*
Total

No.
Prosecutions

Fines
Outcome
N/A

8
2
64
1
I
8
24
12
42

I
1
3

162

*Some of theseare probably logging related.

No.
5

Min.

2
2
1
5

28
0
I
5
8
6
23

$ 100
0
50
0
50
3500
250
250
25

15

76

25

Avg.
$12620
0
459
0
50
55900
7344
2117
12032
9259

Max.

Total

$ 25000
0
2500
0
50
120000
21500
6000
140000

$ 63100
0
12850
0
50
279500
58750
12700
276725

140000

$703675
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Commission of Canada on the issues of environmental enforcement and
the relative role of civil and criminal sanctions.86 The initiation of cases
by the federal Environmental Protection Service has been largely replaced
in the post-1977 period by the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans.
Several tentative conclusions can be drawn from these data. First, in
the period 1970 to 1982, most Fisheries Act charges were laid in British
Columbia where both fishing and other primary resources industries such
as forestry are major activities. These data also highlight the broader issue
of inter-resource development conflicts 7 which impact upon the state of
the natural environment. Second, as expected from the structure of fines
in the Fisheries Act, 88 actual penalties under section 33(2) have been
higher than under section 33(3). However, these fines are still generally
small, leaving as moot the issue of whether such modest penalties act as
an effective deterrent to environmental degradation. Fines for corporations
are greater than those for individuals but not to a large degree. It can be
argued that the moral stigma of guilt may, in certain circumstances, be
a more persuasive disincentive to corporations than monetary penalties.
However, a recent Peat Marwick report for the Ontario government on
the effectiveness
of pollution control regulations in that province has
89
concluded that:
[i]n some industries, the costs of control and abatement are large,
so that the costs of compliance with required programs may greatly
exceed the costs of non-compliance including the occasional prosecution. In these cases, there is a strong economic incentive to delay
[original emphasis] and procrastinate for long periods of time.
Third, the success rate on prosecutions under the Fisheries Act appears
to have fallen somewhat over the period under study. One reason for this
occurrence is that companies have successfully argued the due diligence
defense more frequently over the last five to seven years than was the
case in the mid-1970s. The data presented above may beg the question,
however, as there is no simple way of determining the number of marginal
cases not brought to trial due to uncertain evidence. Fourth, the bulk of
the fines are forestry-related, reflecting the dominant position of British
86. Lynn Heustis, Policing Pollution: the Prosecution of Environmental Offences (Sept. 1984)
(working paper, Law Reform Commission of Canada); Edward Keyserling, Crimes Against the
Environment 44 (1985) (working paper, Law Reform Commission of Canada); Webb, supra note
82.
87. See, e.g., A.H.J. DORCEY, M.W. McPHEE & S. SYDNEYSMITH, SALMON PROTECTION AND THE
B.C. COASTAL FOREST INDUSTRY: ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AS A BARGAINING PROCESS (1980).
88. See Table 2, supra.
89. Peat Marwick & Partners, Economic Incentive Policy Instruments to Implement Pollution
Control Objectives in Ontario VIII-I (July 1983) (report to Ontario Ministry of the Environment).
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Columbia in the statistics. Finally, while not apparent from the data as
presented, the bulk of section 33(2) prosecutions are spills," often oil
related.
The conclusions from these data are mixed. While the number of repeat
offenders is low, several issues remain unresolved. First, it is difficult to
perceive how many charges might or should have been laid if there had
been a more effective information base supporting the efforts of the regulatory agency. Second, as stated above, most prosecutions are associated
with spills or upset conditions at a plant. Only a small proportion of
prosecutions relate to ordinary day to day discharges from ongoing operations. It is common practice at both the provincial and federal levels
to permit higher discharges for older industrial plants.9" This practice is
understandable because of a legitimate concern for the financial capability
of older establishments to comply, at least in the short run, with new,
more stringent effluent standards. Nevertheless, since this economic concern is unrelated to environmental considerations, a situation exists where
a significant number of industrial plants are not meeting standards which
may be considered desirable for environmental protection.
Perhaps more important is the issue of bargaining for compliance that,
as described earlier, tends to characterize much of the environmental
regulatory system in Canada. In essence, enforcement of pollution standards may be achieved in many other ways beside prosecution. Prosecution is frequently considered the weapon of last resort when internal
negotiating processes break down. 92 One of the principal drawbacks of
negotiation is the temptation for polluters to delay compliance when
governments appear unwilling or unable to exercise their coercive powers.
A recent multidisciplinary study undertaken for the Economic Council of
Canada on the use of environmental regulation has provided documentation where excessive reliance on negotiation for compliance appears to
have compromised the goal of acceptable environmental quality. This is
90. See, e.g., Lynne Heustis, Pilot Study Report S. 32 Fisheries Act 104 (Aug. 1985) (Canada
Dept. of Justice, Federal Statutes Compliance Project).
91. See, e.g., B.C. MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, POLLUTION
CONTROL OBJECTIVES FOR THE FOREST PRODUCTS INDUSTRY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (1977); ENVIRONMENT CANADA, PULP AND PAPER EFFLUENT REGULATIONS (Nov. 1971).
92. Included among the panoply of non-prosecutorial compliance mechanisms are: performance
standards developed in consultation with regulatees, tiering of regulatory requirements for reporting
and inspection to fit the particular circumstances surrounding the regulatee, negotiation of compliance
schedules, publicity about compliance status, threats of more severe penalties, monitoring requirements (Heustis, supra note 90, at 108-14); and other noncompulsive or persuasive compliance
mechanisms such as the accelerated capital cost allowance for pollution abatement, governmentsponsored abatement technology research programs, and federal grant programs to such sectors as
pulp and paper for industrial plant modernization (Webb, supra note 82, at 508-612). See also Canada
Dept. of Justice, Compliance with Federal Statutes (Feb. 1984) (draft Information Paper).
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particularly the case with several pulp and paper mills as well as metal
smelters such as INCO's plant at Sudbury, Ontario.93
The apparent failure of the negotiating process in these cases does not
in itself suggest that the mere adoption of a more aggressive and adversarial approach would be preferable. Threats by industries such as INCO
and Noranda Mines to close94 and/or move operations out of the country
would not necessarily be mitigated by a more distant relationship between
regulators and regulatees. What this situation does suggest is at least two
possible courses of action. First, an effort by regulators to gather more
financial and technological information in order to assess the capacity of
industry to comply without serious financial difficulties; this activity of
information gathering and assessment is not without cost, however. And
second, the exploration of innovative regulatory mechanisms which provide graduated financial incentives for compliance. Such mechanisms as
marketable pollution rights or effluent charges promise, at least in theory,
the opportunity to improve economic efficiency in pollution control and
avoid the zero-one dilemma of compliance or shutdown which hampers
the process of regulation. The use of regulatory instruments such as
effluent charges is not a panacea, however. It does not relieve the regulator
of the necessity of gathering and assessing relevant monitoring information and of standing ready to implement the "command and response"
regulatory process in circumstances of urgent environmental concern.
One of the most candid assessments of governmental attitudes and
practices in the enforcement of environmental regulations is provided by
a special Task Force established in 1980 by British Columbia's Ministry
of the Environment to investigate pollution in the Fraser River.95 This
special body of government investigators was formed in response to
documentation provided by an environmental group suggesting the existence of excessive discharges by industry and municipalities on the
river.
93. A.

THOMPSON, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CANADA: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE REGULATORY

(1980); Donald N. Dewees, Evaluation of Policies for Regulating Environmental Pollution
(Sept. 1980) (Economic Council of Canada, Working Paper No. 4); Brian E. Felske & Assoc., Ltd.,
Environmental Protection Regulation and the Non-Ferrous Metals Industry (Feb. 17, 1981) (Economic Council of Canada, Tech. Rep. No. 3); and see particularly P. Victor & T. Burrell, Environmental Protection Regulation: Water Pollution and the Canadian Pulp and Paper Industry ch. 6
(Aug. 1981) (Economic Council of Canada, Tech. Rep. No. 14); Standing Comm. on Resources
Development, Legislature of the Province of Ontario, Final Report on Acidic Precipitation, Abatement
of Emissions from the International Nickel Company Operations at Sudbury, Pollution Control in
the Pulp and Paper Industry, and Pollution Abatement at the Reed Paper Mill in Dryden 50, 79 (Oct.
1979).
94. NorandaMines Links Pollution Control Costs to Fate of Its Smelter, Globe & Mail, May 31,
1984, at B4, col. 3.
95. A. Ackerman & B. Clapp, Fraser River Task Force Report (Jul. 30, 1980) (unpublished
report, B.C. Ministry of the Environment).
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It was found that many of the Pollution Control Permits were written
in ambiguous or vague terms and lacking specific information. This
often made enforcement of these documents difficult.
Our investigations of the operations involved perusal of the Water
Management Branch files to determine the background knowledge
of permits, approvals, etc. In most instances, we observed that the
recommendations submitted by the Regional Biologist and technicians of Waste Management Branch, B.C. Fish and Wildlife Branch
and Federal Fisheries Staff which identified present and future problems, such as leachate, were ignored. This, ultimately, in many cases
resulted in either illegal pollutions or severe environmental damage
from permitted sites.
It was also found that many of the orders issued pursuant to a permit
or to a violation were poorly worded and again, too vague. Common
problems centered around such things as lack of termination of operation dates for cease and desist orders and lack of specific instructions relating to such matters as remedial action. This literally made
enforcement of these orders impossible.
Enforcement of permits and orders was lacking on many occasions
and this proved to be a serious problem when the Task Force came
to investigate the company. Although a company would be in violation of a permit for, in some cases, two or three years, no legal
action had taken place by Waste Management Branch. This resulted
in almost tacit approval by the Branch and caused problems for the
Task Force when it came time for the decision to lay charges because
of the "due diligence" rule.
Another problem centered around the actual finding of violations of
permits by Waste Management Branch staff and the reporting of
same on compliance checks. The teams would constantly encounter
major violations which were easily identifiable yet would observe
no record of the non-compliances of a permit which caused a deadly
toxic substance to enter the Fraser River. Three days after the team
visited one site, two Waste Management staff members visited the
same site and reported no violations. These violations are still continuing today.
The Task Force also observed many instances of lack of enforcement
of specific orders issued by Waste Management staff.
Again, wording on some of these orders proved to be too vague to
enforce, thus making them literally useless."
96. Id. at 13-15.
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The Task Force made several recommendations in an attempt to rectify
what it perceived was a serious deterioration of water quality in the Fraser
River. Two of the strongest recommendations were "that the [B.C.]
Ministry make a major attempt to change the past philosophy of the Waste
Management Branch from 'non-enforcement' to 'enforcement'";97 and
that "the practice of amending Pollution Control permits to justify or
legalize discharges in excess of present permits be stopped. "9
It is probable that the results of this Task Force report in 1980 contributed at least in part to the replacement of the Pollution Control Act
in British Columbia by the Environment Management Act" and Waste
Management Act."° Nevertheless, it appears that not all of the recommendations have been adopted by the provincial government. With respect
to the practice of amending permits, for example, the Minister of the
Environment is currently granting variances on permits to several of the
largest effluent dischargers in the province. Two other regulatory mechanisms currently used in British Columbia for sanctioning noncompliance
are letters of approval and extensions of compliance deadlines.
More recent documentation of the difficulties of enforcement are provided in a 1982 report on the B.C. Ministry of the Environment by the
provincial Auditor General.' This in-depth analysis identified several
factors which hamper the achievement of environmental control objectives
by the Ministry: first, significant information deficiencies concerning the
backlog of identified sources to be controlled, the compliance status of
current permit holders, pollutant discharge estimates, and complete inventories of known discharges; second, lack of clear objectives or guidance on identifying and flagging significant dischargers, identifying
noncompliance and responding appropriately to different types of noncompliance situations; and third, poor permit drafting which does not
always provide a suitable basis for establishng control over dischargers.
The combination of these administrative shortcomings has led to a situation where dischargers commonly ignore requirements to supply infor02
mation to the Ministry and there is a high incidence of permit violation. 1
In sum, the reports by the Fraser River Task Force and Auditor General
seem to provide a rather compelling argument in favor of overlapping
governmental jurisdiction in an area as important as environmental control.
97. Id. at 26.
98. Id. at 27.
99. S.B.C. 1980-81, c. 14.
100. S.B.C. 1982, c. 41.
101. See B.C. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REPORT OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL FOR THE YEAR

31 MARCH 1981, 107, 119, 121, 123, 126, 128, 130 (Apr. 7, 1982).
102. Id. at 130.
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Overlap and Duplication in Regulatory Control
Both the federal and provincial levels of government are actively involved in the area of environmental control. The lack of a clear constitutional assignment of jurisdiction has led to a situation where several
disparate constitutional provisions provide the current legal justification
for frequent circumstances of overlap and duplication of regulatory authority. Recent political stresses associated with constitutional repatriation
and the division of resource revenues, coupled with the complex chemical
and biological problems of modern environmental pollution, pose a threat
to the effective functioning of the historical regulatory structure.
The constitutional rights accorded the provincial governments with
respect to natural resource ownership' 3 appear to place the burden of
environmental control primarily on the provinces. Clean air and water
are "natural resources" in the most important sense. This view of provincial predominance is also bolstered by subsections 10, 13, and 16 of
the Constitution Act's Section 92 which grant the control of "local works
and undertakings," "property and civil rights," and "generally all matters
of a merely local or private nature" to the provincial governments. The
de facto division of responsibility between the federal and provincial
government, at least with respect to the more traditional types of pollution
tends to reinforce this view of the provinces as the lead governments with
respect to several important aspects of environmental control.
Despite this apparent constitutional rationale for a provincial role in
environmental control, there are persuasive arguments supporting a distinctive federal presence in the area of pollution prevention. The division
of powers in the Constitution Act has given the federal government jurisdiction over trade and commerce,' 4 taxation,105 census and statistics,'0 6
navigation and shipping, 0 7 sea coast and inland fisheries,' 8 the criminal
law,'" 9 the treaty power,"0 and, perhaps ultimately most important, the
general power to "make laws for the peace, order and good government
of Canada.""'
It is important to consider not only the justification for a de jure federal
presence in the field of environmental control," 2 but also to examine the
103. Constitution Act, 1982, § 109.
104. Id. at § 91(2).
105. ld. at §91(3).
106. Id. at §91(6).
107. Id. at §91(10).
108. Id. at § 91(12).
109. Id. at § 91(27).
110. Id. at § 132.
111. Id. at §91.
112. The constitutional distinction between federal and provincial authority in the area of environmental control was illustrated by judgments of the federal Supreme Court concerning the federal
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rationale for instances of overlap and duplication in research and enforcement. This overlap of federal and provincial environmental protection
appears to violate a basic evaluative criterion such as economic efficiency
that strongly supports a clear division of labor in the face of resource
constraints. Part of the explanation for this apparent regulatory inefficiency lies in the federal system created to overcome the significant
geographic impediments to an effective unitary government. While it can
be argued that provincial governments are in a better position to address
issues of local environmental concern because of proximity, regional
governments occasionally feel a greater compulsion, born of economic
necessity, to accommodate industrial interests that make a major contribution to local employment and tax revenues. The federal government
having, as it does, a responsibility for the environmental health of the
entire nation, must adopt a broader calculus of costs and benefits. This
is particularly the case where air or water pollution is of sufficient magnitude and severity to generate interprovincial effects. In internalizing
these provincial externalities, the federal government may implement
environmental policies which superficially appear too strict from a provincial viewpoint. In the past, this has occasionally led to the disruption
of communication and information exchange between provincial and federal pollution control agencies. By necessity, the geographically restricted
purview of the provinces has led to the use of important federal statutory
instruments such as the Fisheries Act when provincial response to environmental threats has not been immediately forthcoming. While the existence of two authorities in the same field may appear to impede the
formation and implementation of environmental policy, this coexistent
jurisdiction can, in fact, increase the effectiveness of the complex process
of environmental control.
Fisheries Act. The first, Fowler v. The Queen, (1980) 53 C.C.C. (2d) 97, 32 N.R. 230, held § 33(3)
of the Fisheries Act to be ultra vires; while the second, Northwest Falling Contractors Ltd. v. The
Queen (1980) 53 C.C.C. (2d) 353, held § 33(2) intra vires. In writing for the Court in the latter
case, Justice Martland stated:
The situation in this case is different from that which was considered in Fowler v.
The Queen, a judgment of this court recently delivered. That case involved the
constitutional validity of § 33(3) of the Fisheries Act and it was held to be ultra
vires of Parliament to enact. Unlike § (2), § (3) contains no reference to deleterious
substances. It is not restricted by its own terms to activities that are harmful to fish
or fish habitat. The basis of the judgment in the Fowler case is set out in the following
passage: "Section 33(3) makes no attempt to link the proscribed conduct to actual
or potential harm to fisheries. It is a blanket prohibition of certain types of activity,
subject to provincial jurisdiction, which does not delimit the elements of the offence
so as to link the prohibition to any likely harm to fisheries." Id. at 105-06. In my
opinion, § 33(2) was intra vires of the Parliament of Canada to enact. The definition
of "deleterious substance" ensures that the scope of § 33(2) is restricted to a prohibition of deposits that threaten fish, fish habitat, or the use of fish by man.
53 C.C.C. (2d) 359-60.
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There are several other compelling reasons for a significant federal
presence. First, it would be unusual in any confederation for all levels
of government to have identical and/or necessarily consistent attitudes
toward environmental control. There is an indispensable role for a centralized coordinating authority with the power to prevent destructive,
competitive bidding for industrial development which could lead to the
creation of pollution havens. However, the presence of the federal government is not, in itself, sufficient to prevent the occurrence of divergent
provincial attitudes and behavior in the field of environmental control.
For example, British Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland have
been slow to participate in some cooperative federal-provincial environmental initiatives such as the inventorying of hazardous waste dump
sites.113 In addition, some environmental hazards such as the pesticide
2,4,5-T, frequently contaminated with dioxin, have been banned in Ontario, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia but not in other provinces.
The pattern and intensity of regulatory response clearly varies among
provincial jurisdictions. In one case, a provincial government agency
rebated $1 million of a $1.6 million occupational health levy to a large
industrial corporation on the grounds that a proposed modernization program would mitigate the existing hazards to employee health. The agency
refused to change its decision in spite of complaints from two labor unions
and a subsequent failure of the corporation to implement its proposals
for the plant area under consideration." 4
An important justification for continuing federal research in the area
of environmental degradation is provided by the even greater resource
constraints which affect provincial governments. It is very difficult, if not
impossible, for a provincial agency to maintain a sufficiently large information gathering network and research capability to remain abreast of
the rapidly evolving ecological and technological information pertaining
to the effects of pollutants and their control. The federal role is especially
central to guarantee that provincial policy is not formulated in the absence
of sufficient information. Unfounded provincial statements about the safety
of chemicals such as 2,4,5-T" 5 or provincial recommendations for the
use of federally banned pesticides ' 6 provide a particularly cogent and
compelling demonstration of the need for centralized and advanced in113. Environment Canada, Situation Report on Management of Hazardous Wastes (Oct. 1981,
Apr. 1982), cited in J.F. CASTRILLI, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT IN CANADA: THE LEGAL AND

at 113, n. 122 (1983).
114. Decision to End Cominco Fine Angers Workers, Vancouver Sun, Sept. 30, 1981 at A14,
col. i; We have earned the carrot, says Cominco on penalty refunds, The Province, Oct. 9, 1981
at B2, col. 1; Cominco allowed to drop "clean air" smelter work, Vancouver Sun, June 7, 1982 at
Al, col.1.
115. Dioxin Sprays safe, B.C. says, The Province, July 9, 1974, at 21, col. 5.
116. Banned Chemical Urged for Crops, Globe & Mail, Nov. 5, 1983, at A5, col. 2.
REGULATORY RESPONSE
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formation gathering, generation, and dissemination. A recent study of
comparative environmental standards conducted for the Alberta government reported a hesitancy of some provincial officials to proceed against
major industrial polluters." 7 Coupled with this reluctance is a perception
by some provincial regulators that if prosecution is undertaken using
provincial environmental legislation, fines will be "trivial," or at least
lower than those imposed under federal statutes such as the Fisheries
Act. 118

Clearly, the perception of regulators in this matter is critical as it dictates
the capacity and willingness of the bureaucracy, independent of political
influence, to prosecute environmental offenders. Tables 8 through 10
present some limited empirical evidence to test the validity of this perception. The data are classified in two categories: a comparison of federal
and provincial (in this case, B.C.) environmental prosecutions under the
federal Fisheries Act; and a comparison of prosecutions in British Columbia under the Fisheries Act and the provincial Pollution Control Act.
Table 8 describes the de facto division of effort with regard to the
Fisheries Act from 1970 to 1976. Comparable data for the period 1977
to date are not available. The number of prosecutions is probably a more
useful comparative variable than the average level of fines, as the actual
penalty is ultimately determined by the judiciary. Neverthless, the provincial and federal regulatory agencies do have an important impact on
the penalty level through their representations in the courtroom. Over the
period 1970 to 1974, British Columbia initiated twenty-six prosecutions
with nineteen fines totalling $19,235 with an average of $1,012 per fine.
In the same period in British Columbia, ninety-eight federal prosecutions
netted seventy-six fines totalling $68,650 with an average fine of $903.
The level of fines associated with federal and provincial prosecutions
appears approximately equivalent although the provincial average is strongly
affected by two penalties of $5,000 each against a pulp mill and a mining
operation in 1971.
It may be more appropriate to compare the federal Fisheries Act with
the provincial Pollution Control Act because, in the latter case, the provincial government determines both the number of prosecutions and,
through the legislative process, the maximum level of fines possible.
Table 9 presents a complete listing of all B.C. water related prosecutions
under provincial pollution control legislation from 1971 to 1983; and
117. M.A.H. FRANSON, R.T. FRANSON & A.R. LUCAS, ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CANADIAN STANDARDS, STANDARD SETTING PROCESSES AND ENFORCEMENT 195
(1982).
118. See, e.g., Rankin & Finkle, The Enforcementof EnvironmentalLaw: Taking the Environment
Seriously, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE 1980s: A NEW BEGINNING 169 (P. Finkle & A. Lucas eds.
1982).
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Table 8. Comparison of Federal and Provincial Environmental Prosecutions under the Fisheries Act in British Columbia, 1970-76
Provincial prosecutions

Federal prosecutions

Year

No.

No. fines

Avg. fine

No.

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

6
6
4
5
5
n.a.
n.a.

5
4
3
3
4
n.a.
n.a.

$ 217
2950
350
867
675
n.a.
n.a.

25
20
13
21
19
17
19

No. fines

Avg. fine

24
15
8
15
14
13
17

$ 634
1047
1216
1080
843
722
803

n.a. =not available.

Table 9. Water Pollution Prosecutions under the Pollution Control Act* of British Columbia

Year

No.
Actions

Acquitted/
Dismissed/
Withdrawn/
Stayed

I
1
8
10
9
10
9
3
7
10
10
8
15

0
0
2
1
3
1
4
1
2
5
5
3
4

1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

Fines

?

1

1
1
1
5

No.
1
1
6
9
5
9
5
2
4
4
5
4
6

Min.

Avg.

$750
700
100
50
75
100
10
100
500
100
200
300
200

$ 750
700
410
356
1005
363
792
1800
1300
1400
1540
2200
1383

Max.
$ 750
700
700
750
3050
900
3000
3500
3000
3000
3500
6000
5000

-The Pollution Control Act was superceded by the Environment Management Act of 1981and the Water Management Act of 1982.

Table IOn. Comparison of Federally Initiated Environmental Prosecutions under the Fisheries Act in B.C. with Provincially Initiated
Water Pollution Prosecutions under the Pollution Control Act, 1971-76
Provincial Actions under the
B.C. Pollution Control Act
Number of Actions
Number of Fines
Rangeof Fines
Total Fines
Average Fine

39
31
$50-$3050
$14625
$ 504

Federal Actions under
the Fisheries Act
108
82
$25-$5000
$75108
$ 916

Table lOb. Comparison of Federally Initiated Environmental Prosecutions under the Fisheries Act in B.C. with Provincial Prosecutions
under the B.C. Pollution Control Act and WasteManagement Act, 1977-82

Number of Actions
Number of Fines
Rangeof Fines
Total Fines
Average Fine

Actions under
Pollution Control Act and
WasteManagement Act

Actions under
the Fisheries Act

47
23
$10-$6000
$32861
$ 1429

163
78
$25-$140000
$703675
$ 9021
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Tables 10a and 10b contrast federally-initiated prosecutions under the
Fisheries Act with provincially-initiated actions under the former B.C.
Pollution Control Act (1967), Environmental Management Act of 1981,
and Waste Management Act of 1982.
The data for British Columbia in Tables 10a and 10b appear to lend
credence to the concern of some regulators and environmental researchers
that, for the aforementioned reasons, prosecution under provincial legislation may not always be as vigorous or as costly to the pollutor as that
under federal statute. The question remains, however, to what degree the
conclusions generated with respect to British Columbia can be generalized
to other regions of Canada. Prior to 1977, the vast majority of Fisheries
Act prosecutions occurred in British Columbia and this pattern has continued to date. Most other provinces, such as Ontario, actively prosecute
under their own provincial legislation. It can be argued, nevertheless,
that the existence of the federal government as an active litigant in parts
of Canada such as British Columbia, and as a potential litigant elsewhere,
creates a more effective system of environmental control." 9
Liability
The enforcement of environmental regulations in Canada is confounded
by the existence of three categories of liability: first, the traditional criminal law standard where the onus is upon the crown to prove mens rea,
or intent; second, absolute liability "incurred by reason of the mere
occurrence of an accident of a kind deemed prohibited, without regard
to care or precautions taken and without need for proof of negligence or
fault . . . [it is] liability for specified conduct or results independently of
intention or other mental factor"; 12 o and third, "strict liability" as enunciated in R v. Sault Ste. Marie. 2' In this landmark decision, Justice
Dickson created a new intermediate category of offense under the rubric
of "strict liability" where the crown need not prove mens rea but where
119. There are several other related political and economic rationales for the presence of two
levels of government in matters of national interest. The first is political in nature, and based on the
general social benefits assumed to accrue from multiple loci of power, as in the American model of
government. The second rationale is economic and may be derived from such works as A. BRETON
& A. Scorr, THE DESIGN OF FEDERATIONS (1980). The authors conclude that "federal forms [of
government] are to be preferred to unitary forms" (p. 12) because the inherent competition "implies
the existence of alternatives. This is widely recognized, and often criticized, as involving duplication
and overlap; but those who fault federalism for competitiveness and duplication fault it for its main
virtue" (p. 14). This is clearly a symmetrical proposition and one which not only lends support to
a federal presence in environmental control, but also a provincial presence if and when a federal
government suffers a lapse in will or ability to protect the environment. See, e.g., Alice Arm Tailing
Deposit Regulation, SOR/79-3435.
120. D.M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 6 (1980).
121. 85 DLR 1978 (3d) 161.
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the defendant may invoke a defence of reasonable care, or "due diligence." As Justice Dickson stated in his judgment:
I conclude for the reasons which I have sought to express, that there
are compelling grounds for the recognition of three categories of
offences rather than the traditional two:
1. Offences in which mens rea, consisting of some positive state of
mind such as intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by
the prosecution either as an inference from the nature of the act
committed, or by additional evidence.
2. Offences in which there is not necessity for the prosecution to
prove the existence of mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima
facie imports the offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid
liability by proving that he took all reasonable care. This involves
consideration of what a reasonable man would have done in the
circumstances. The defence will be available if the accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would render
the act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps to
avoid the particular event. These offences may properly be called
offences to strict liability. Mr. Justice Estey so referred to them in
Hickey's case.
3. Offences of absolute liability where it is not open to the accused
to exculpate himself by showing that he was free of fault.' 22
The "due diligence" defence available under strict liability has been
criticized by some legal scholars as being inconsistent with the theory of
pollution permits or licenses and significantly inhibiting prosecutors and
enforcement officials in the process of environmental protection.' 2 3 This
uniquely Canadian interpretation of the concept of "strict liability" in R
v. Sault Ste. Marie differs from the traditional usage where reasonable
care is not considered one of the operative defenses.' 24 Offenses under
section 33(2) of the federal Fisheries Act have been held to fall in the
category of strict liability; 25 although liability is considered absolute under
Sections 10, 10.1, and 10.2 pertaining to civil liability.
The nature of liability and burden of proof imposed by governments
tend to vary by jurisdiction and statute although the legislation is often
silent on the interpretation of liability. Under these circumstances, strict
liability is usually assumed, along the lines specified by Justice Dickson.
British Columbia's new Waste Management Act of 1982 specifically
imposes strict liability for waste disposal, littering, and discharge of waste
122.
123.
124.
125.

85 DLR 1978 (3d) 181-82.
FRANsoN, FRANSON & LUCAS, supra note 117, at 191-92.
WALKER, supra note 120, at 1193.
Franson & Lucas, EnvironmentalLaw Commentaries in 2 CAN. ENVT'L L. 480 (1981).
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from recreational vehicles. Section 10(6) reads: "[in a prosecution for
a contravention of subsection (5) [pertaining to spills], it shall be presumed
that the accused knew of the escape, spill or introduction at the time of
the alleged contravention and the burden of proving that he did not know
is on him." 26
There has been a vigorous debate in Ontario between the provincial
government on the one hand and the insurance industry and Canadian
Manufacturing Association on the other over a controversial amendment
to the province's Environmental Protection Act.' 27 Known as the "Spills
Bill,"' 28 this amendment instituted absolute liability for pollution and
generated such fervent opposition from industry that the government felt
compelled to withhold promulgation and establish an industrial consultative task force to reexamine the bill. Of particular concern to industry
were provisions which removed recourse to the courts, and imposed
unlimited and retroactive liability for major pollutant spills. 2' 9 The Ontario
government proclaimed the "Spills Bill" on November 29, 1985 and
subsequently announced the arrangement of a liability insurance pool to
cover sudden and accidental pollution risks.
Absolute liability also appears in the federal Arctic Water Pollution
Prevention Act, 3 ' Manitoba's Fisherman's Assistance and Polluters' Liability Act,' 3 ' and has been established by case law 3 2 on section 6(1)(b)
of the Canada Shipping Act, Oil Pollution Prevention Regulations.' 33
It appears that the issue of liability in Canadian environmental regulation remains to be resolved. Several legal scholars have suggested that
the difficulties generated by the due diligence defense of "strict liability"
in Canada may warrant new bureaucratic and/or legislative initiatives to
return consistency and effectiveness to the regulation of pollution. '
The Role of Public Input
Historically, the role of public input into the framing and enforcement
126. S.B.C. 1982, c. 41, s. 10(6).
127. R.S.O. 1980, c. 141.
128. R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, Part IX, s. 79-112.
129. Canadian Chemical Producers Ass'n, Brief on Ontario Bill 24, An Act to Amend the Environmental Protection Act (June 18, 1979); Canadian Agricultural Chemicals Ass'n., Submission
to the Province of Ontario Standing Committee on Resource Development in Respect of Bill 24,
An Act to Amend the Environmental Protection Act (1971); Spills Bill CreatingTurmoil and Unease,
Globe & Mail, Aug. 1, 1983, at B2, col. 1; Ontario Rethinks Pollution Bill in Light on Insurance
Question, Globe & Mail, Jan. 26, 1984, at B2, col. 1; and Truckers Present Plan to Clarify Spills
Liability, Globe & Mail, Feb. 13, 1984 at IB5, col. 1.
130. R.S.C. 1970 (1st Supp.) c. 2, s. 7(1).
131. S.M. 1970, c. 32, s. 4(1).
132. R. v. The Vessel "Aran" (1972), 7 C.C.C. (2d) 562, aff'd (1972), 9 C.C.C. (2d) 179
(B.C.C.A.) (Dig. [WP-3]); R. v. The Vessel "Dilkara," [1974] 1 W.W.R. 528 (B.C.C.A.) (Dig.
[WP-5]); R. v. The Vessel "City Guildford" (1975), 27 C.C.C. (2d) 212 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
133. CRC, Vol. XVI, c. 1454.
134. FRANSON, FRANSON & LUCAS, supra note 117, at 191-92.
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of environmental regulation in Canada has been significantly less than in
the United States. The nexus between government and industry has tended
to exclude an extensive public role until recently. Of the provinces, only
British Columbia has had substantial provision for public participation. 35
'
Under Section 14 of the former B.C. Pollution Control Act'36 of 1967,
the public was allowed to participate in hearings which established industry-wide objectives for air and water pollution. Although complaints
were raised that the extent of this role was restricted to technical considerations during hearings,' 37 this process represented at least some formalized avenue for public input. Unfortunately, neither B.C.'s new Waste
Management Act' 38 nor Environment Management Act 39 contains a provision for such participation. This is clearly a regressive step.
In the last decade, the federal government has taken the initiative with
regard to public participation through such mechanisms as Environment
Canada's "Policy for Public Consultation and Information Availability"
of 1982;"' ° and through much broader reforms in the form of the Statutory
Instruments Act' 4' of 1972, the federal Environmental Assessment and
Review Process of 1973,42 and the SocioEconomic Impact Analysis (SEIA)
procedure initiated in 1978. "' The Statutory Instruments Act was designed
to strengthen the accountability to Parliament and the public of the exercise of delegated power. Proposals for regulation are screened through
a process of review and publication. This system is reinforced by an
additional review conducted by the Standing Joint Committee on Regulations and Other Statutory Instruments. The SEIA is required of those
federal departments introducing major new regulations in the domains of
Health, Safety, and Fairness:
[tlhis policy is intended to: (a) promote a more thorough and systematic analysis of the socio-economic impact of new (Health, Safety
and Fairness) regulations in order to prevent misallocative effects
and/or negative effects of a non-allocative nature; (b) ensure uniformity across departments and agencies currently administering statutes which confer the power to make regulations . . . (as well) in
135. Id. at 94.
136. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 332, repealed by S.B.C. 1982, c. 41, effective Sept. 16, 1982.
137. L.J. Kolankiewicz, Implementation of British Columbia's Pollution Control Act, 1967, in
the Lower Fraser River iii, 78 (July 1981) (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, School of Community and
Regional Planning, University of British Columbia).
138. S.B.C. 1982, c. 41.
139. S.B.C. 1980-81, c. 14.
140. ENVIRONMENT CANADA, POLICY FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION AND INFORMATION AVAILABILITY
(1982); see also ENVIRONMENT CANADA, EPS ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY UPDATE 4 (Nov. 1983).
141. R.S.C. 1970-71, c. 38.
142. See CANADIAN COUNCIL OF RESOURCE AND ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS, ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT IN CANADA: 1985 ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT PRACTICE (July 1985).

143. See Treasury Board Canada, The Socio-Economic Impact Analysis Policy: The Role of the
Private Sector (undated).
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the methodologies and assumptions used to perform such analyses;
and (c) provide an opportunity for increased public participation in
the regulations-making process.'"
The historical impediments to public input to the formation of regulations have been compounded by economic and legal barriers to public
participation in enforcement. For example, traditional cost rules in Canada
concerning the financing of legal fees and disbursements have presented
a major obstacle to public participation in court proceedings.' 45 In addition, while the common law has retained an important role, at least
potentially, in the protection of the environment and individuals from
certain types of hazards, several factors have tended to mitigate the usefulness of common law actions in the Canadian context. Historically, the
most important has been the bar to class actions. 46 There has been,
however, some recent mitigation of the class action prohibition in Canada. 7 Such actions are now allowed under specific circumstances where
there is a common interest or identity of situation among the members
of a narrowly defined class.' 48
The problem remains, however, that in most cases related to environmental damage, the public has no locus standi.4'9 In Alberta the permission
of the Attorney General must be obtained before action is commenced
under a private prosecution. "' This might tend to inhibit the process of
environmental control where the source of pollution in question is associated with a crown corporation or any other entity indirectly owned
or controlled by a provincial government.
Again, the federal government has tended to be more progressive in
its reform in this area. There is provision in regulations under the Fisheries
Act entitling private informants to half of both fines levied and proceeds
from the sale of any seized assets after successful prosecution of a polluter. 5 A recent case in British Columbia attracted particular attention
when information laid by a citizen's group against two companies polluting the Fraser River netted the initiators one-half of the total $28,000
144. Treasury Board Canada, Socio-economic Impact Analysis of Health, Safety and Fairness
Regulation (circa 1979); see also Secretariat, Treasury Board of Canada, The Socio-Economic Impact
Analysis Policy: The Role of the Private Sector (undated).
145. Anand & Scott, Financing Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 60-1
CAN. BAR REv. 81 (Mar. 1982). See also T.F. Schrecker, Political Economy of Environmental
Hazards (1984) (Protection of Life Series Study Paper, Law Reform Comm'n of Canada).
146. Market & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., 1910 2 K.B. 1021 at 1035 [C.A.].
147. See Thorson v. The Attorney General of Canada et al (1975) 1 S.C.R. 138, and Stein v.
The City of Winnipeg, (1974) 48 DLR(3D) 223.
148. See Naken et al. v. General Motors of Canada Ltd. et al (1978) 92 D.L.R. (3rd) at 100.
149. THOMPSON, supra note 93, at 89.
150. Alberta Clean Water Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. C-13, s. 17(9).
151. Penalties and Forfeitures Proceeds Regulations (C.R.C. 1878 Vol. VII, c. 827), s. 5.
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fine."'5 2 A second case initiated by the same environmental group against
a landfill operation on the Fraser River was also successful in November
1982 with a fine of $25,000. ' Clearly, there appears to be an important
role for this type of citizen initiative given the constraint on resources
available to governmental regulatory agencies. The successful prosecution
of these two actions under the Fisheries Act has allayed fears that this
type of innovative regulatory mechanism would lead to frivolous activity
directed at non-existent environmental problems.' 54
At least one other important opportunity for public activity in environmental protection is afforded by private prosecutions. Instances of this
type of activity are rare, however, and include:' 55 a 1980/81 action by
the Union of B.C. Indian Chiefs against the Greater Vancouver Regional
District and Greater Vancouver Sewage and Drainage District for violation
of section 33(2) of the Fisheries Act while discharging effluent from a
sewage treatment plant; a 1981 action by the Canadian Environmental
Law Association against Cyanamid in Ontario under section 33(2); a
prosecution against the Central Okanagan Regional District in 1983 for
violation of its permit under the B.C. Pesticide Control Act;5 6 and prosecution of the Corporation of the City of North Vancouver in 1983 for
violation of permit requirements concerning the operation of a municipal
landfill. Three other private prosecutions have been initiated under Section
33(2) of the Fisheries Act against Crown Zellerbach Ltd. of B.C. in 1980/
81; the Fraser River Harbour Commission in 1981/82; and Suncor Ltd.
of Alberta in 1982/83. In each of these cases, the federal or provincial
attorney general decided to intervene and conduct proceedings.' 57
Lacunae in CurrentEnvironmental Regulation
It is not surprising that in the field of environmental control, where
information is expanding at a rapid rate and resources available for policy
formulation and implementation are constrained, gaps will exist in the
package of environmental protection measures afforded the population.
Two emergent problems in Canada, drinking water safety and toxic waste
152. River Crusader Wins $14,000, The Province, Apr. 30, 1981, at AI, col. 3; Two FirmsFined
$28,000 for Polluting Fraser River, Vancouver Sun, Apr. 30, 1981, at A3, col. 5.
153. Information provided to the author by Environment Canada, Feb. 1984.
154. See Lynne Huestis, Private Enforcement of Federal Environmental Legislation (1982) (draft,
Law Reform Comm'n. of Canada).
155. Information provided to the author by Ms. Marilyn Kansky, West Coast Environmental Law
Ass'n. (Feb. 1984).
156. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 322.
157. Information provided to the author by Ms. Lynne Huestis, Law Reform Comm'n. of Canada
(Mar. 1984).
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disposal, have already been the subject of heated debate and intensive
research in the United States.
Drinking Water Safety. There are no nationally legislated limits on
pollutants in Canadian drinking water. While guidelines for drinking water
constituents developed through federal-provincial cooperation have existed since 1968, they have no legal status. Indeed, Quebec is the only
province with legally enforceable standards, having passed legislation on
the subject in 1984.58 Concern has been expressed that the current regulatory structure may not guarantee safe drinking water in Canada. A
federal-provincial working group is reexamining the question of drinking
water regulation and is actively considering procedures and limits established by the United States Safe Drinking Water Act'59 of 1974 and the
World Health Organization."
Table 11 presents a brief comparison of selected Canadian and American standards for drinking water. These limits appear generally quite
similar, but three principal deficiencies characterize the Canadian standards: the lack of legal enforceability; the apparently scanty risk-based
analysis which supports many of these current levels in Canada;' 61 and
the limited number of toxic chemicals and biocides currently covered by
Canadian guidelines. As Health and Welfare admits, "it is recognized
that the list of pesticides [included in the Guidelinesfor CanadianDrinking Water Quality, 1978] is not comprehensive and constitutes only1 6a2
small fraction of the number of such substances available in Canada."
Toxic Waste Generationand Disposal. Recognition of the magnitude
of the problem associated with the generation and disposal of toxic wastes
is a relatively recent phenomenon in North America. Generally, American
federal initiatives in this area have been broader and earlier than in Canada
with the passage of major U.S. legislation such as the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act; 163 Occupational Safety and Health Act; 6 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; 65 Marine Protection, Research,
and Sanctuaries Act; 6 Ports and Waterways Safety Act; 67 Consumer
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
(1978).
163.
164.
165.
166.
U.S.C.
167.

O.C. 1158-84 (May 16, 1984). Amendment to Environmental Quality Act R.S.Q. c. Q-2.
42 U.S.C. §§300f-300j-I (1974).
Ottawa Considers Drinking Water Law, Globe & Mail, Feb. 7, 1984, at 7, col. 1.
Is Drinking Water a Potential Time Bomb?, Globe & Mail, June 4, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
Health and Welfare Canada, Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality CAN 97.0
84 Stat. 1670-74 (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 1471-73 (1970).
84 Stat. 1590 (1970); 29 U.S.C. §§651-78 (1970).
7 U.S.C. §§ 135, 136-136Y (1972).
Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
and 33 U.S.C).
33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1232 (1972) and 46 U.S.C.S. § 391a (1972).
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Table 11.Some Canadian and U.S. Standards for Drinking Water (jig/I)
5b

Pollutant
Arsenic
Barium
Boron
Cadmium
Chromium
Cyanide
Lead
Mercury
Nitrate + nitrite
Phenol
Selenium
Silver
Aldrin
Chlordane
DDT
Dieldrin
Endrin
Heplachlor
Heptachlor epoxide
Lindane
Methoxychlor
Organic phosphates +
carbamates'
Toxaphene
Herbicides (e.g., 2,4-D;
2,4,5-T; 2,4,5-TP)

U.S. limits'
50
1000
n.a.
10
50
n.a.
50
2
10000
I
10
50
-minimum"

0.2
"minimum"
"?
4
100

Canadian limits
50
1000
5000
10
50
200
50
d
10000
e
10
50
17
3
42
17
1
18
18
56
35

?
5

100
5

?

100

'From: America Fisheries Society Water Quality Section, A Review of the EPA RedBook: Quality Criteria for Water (Apr. 1979).
bFrom: Health and Welfare Canada, Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality (1978).
as parathion equivalents in cholinesterase inhibition.
Expressed
dl jg/L ("Canadian Recommended Limits for Chemical SubstancesRelated to Health").
'2 pAg/L("Canadian Recommended Limits for Chemical Substances Related to Health").

Resource Conservation
Product Safety Act; 68 Safe Drinking Water Act; ,69
and Recovery Act;' 70 Toxic Substances Control Act; 171 Lead-Based Paint
Poisoning Prevention Act; 172 Clean Water Act; 173 Clean Air Act;' 74 HazEnvironmenardous Materials Transportation Act;175 and Comprehensive
76
tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. 1
Indeed, until recently, the attitude toward the toxic waste problem in
certain parts of Canada could be characterized as somewhat complacent.
One provincial Minister of the Environment was quoted as stating that:
"[n]o inventory of existing or abandoned landfills has been conducted as
the past history of industrialization in this province does not lead us to
believe any significant quantities of toxic wastes have been deposited in
the past. ,177
86 Stat. 1207 (1972); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2082 (1972).
42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-9 (1982).
42 U.S.C. §§6901-6987 (1982).
90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976 & Supp. III1979).
42 U.S.C. §§4801-4846 (1971).
91 Stat. 1566 (YEAR); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1378 (1982).
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1975).
Pub. L. 96-5 10, Dec. 11,1980; 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9657 (1980).
J.F. CASTRILLI, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT IN CANADA: THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY
RESPONSE 131, 148 nn. 308, 403 (1983).
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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In fact, the Canadian industrial system has experienced many, if not
most, of the technological changes experienced by its larger southern
neighbour in the postwar period. The result has been the generation of
similar types, if not quantities, of toxic waste. In an effort to define the
exact extent of the toxic waste generation problem in Canada, several of
the provinces and the federal government commissioned a number of
major research studies within the past four years.""7 Perhaps the most
comprehensive of these was the Gore & Storrie report of 1982 which
attempted to produce detailed disaggregated estimates of waste by geographic area and industry. The estimates were generated by the application
to Canadian industrial plants of U.S. waste generation coefficients based
on S.I.C. categories and employment for U.S. industry. Tables 12 and
13 summarize the findings of the Gore & Storrie study.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated
the American waste total at 56,700,000 metric tons in 1980,179 but revised
its estimates to 150,000,000 metric tons in 1983 and 263,000,000 metric
tons in 1984 after extensive information was provided by waste producers
and handlers.18 ° The data suggest that while the United States has 9.4
times the population of Canada, it generates approximately eighty times
as much waste. Some care must be exercised in the interpretation of these
comparative figures. Because the methodology employed in the Gore &
Storrie Canadian study was based on employment-related coefficients,
the report's findings may provide a more accurate reflection of the sectoral
size and composition of Canadian industry than of its waste generation
per se. In addition, the recent revision of EPA's estimates after inclusion
of more extensive sampling data suggests that Canadian totals based on
earlier EPA estimates may also be significant underestimates. Equally
178.

GORE & STORRIE LTD., CANADIAN NATIONAL INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS WASTES (1982); REID,

CROWTHER & PARTNERS LTD., HAZARDOUS WASTES IN NORTHERN AND WESTERN CANADA-THE NEED

FOR A WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (1980/8 1); REID, CROWTHER & PARTNERS LTD., HAZARDOUS
WASTES IN ALBERTA-AN INVENTORY AND REVIEW OF PRACTICE AND TECHNOLOGY (1980); W.L.
WARDROP & AssoC. LTD., INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS WASTE IN THE NORTHWEST REGION (1979);
PACIFIC REGION ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SERVICE,

CITY OF VANCOUVER

INDUSTRIAL WASTE

INVENTORY 1977(1979); MACLAREN ENGINEERS PLANNERS & SCIENTISTS INC., THE SITING OF FACILITIES
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF LIQUID INDUSTRIAL AND HAZARDOUS WASTES IN ONTARIO (1980); ATLANTIC
REGION ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SERVICE, HAZARDOUS WASTES INVENTORY REPORT (1980); and

M.K. ESTEY & R.G. LUTES, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN NEW BRUNSWICK 1981 (1981).
179. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE: GREATER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED 23-24, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1979); UNITED STATES COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT

218 (1980). Note that another U.S. EPA study estimated total U.S. industrial hazardous waste at
41,235,000 metric tons (wet weight). UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HAZARDOUS
WASTE GENERATION AND COMMERCIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT CAPACITY, AN ASSESSMENT

A-9 (1980). See also UNITED STATES COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 41, at 320.
180. Hazardous Waste Exceeds Estimates, N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1983, at 11, Col. 1; and UNITED
STATES COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 41, at 62.
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Table 12. Toxic WasteSummary Estimate for Canada by Industry (wet weight in tons/year)
Chemicals
Metals
Other

1,535,798
1,257,100
487,965

(46.8%)
(38.3%)

3.280.863

(100.0%)

(14.9%)

3 Gore & Storrie Ltd., Canadian National Inventory of Hazardous and Toxic Wastes8 (Environment Canada, Jan. 1982).
Table 13. Toxic WasteSummary Estimate for Canada by Province (wet weight in tons/year)
Ontario
Quebec
B.C.
Alberta
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Newfoundland
P.E.I.
Yukon

1,605,107
951,917
273,425
215,944
106,857
46,885
30,144
29,458
20,719
406
I

48.9%)
29.0%)
8.3%)
6.6%)
3.3%)
1.4%)
0.9%)
0.9%)
0.6%)

3 Gore & Storrie Ltd., Canadian National Inventory of Hazardous andToxic Wastes8 (Environment Canada, Jan. 1982).

important, these aggregate figures mask the crucial differences in toxicity
associated with various waste streams. Because of the magnitude and
cost of the toxic waste problem, a prioritization process is required for
the regulation of toxic chemical production, use, and disposal, and there
is an indication that such an effort is underway. For example, the federal
governments of both Canada and the United States have1 8focused particular
82
attention on such important toxic pollutants as dioxin ' and PCBs.1
The situation with respect to the identification of toxic dumps in Canada
remains unclear. While the U.S. EPA has already enumerated as many
as 50,644 potentially dangerous sites,183 of which 10,000 or more may
require Superfund cleanup, 184 no such comprehensive study appears to
be available so far in Canada. Documentation in Canada remains sporadic,
based on disparate and incomplete provincial estimates. As many as 435
181. CANADA INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITEE ON TOXIC CHEMICALS, DIOXINS IN CANADA: THE
FEDERAL APPROACH (Dec. 1983); HEALTH AND WELFARE CANADA/ENVIRONMENT CANADA, REPORT
OF THE MINISTERS' EXPERT ADVISORY COMMrTrEE ON DIOXINS (Nov. 1983).

182. Canada, Chlorobiphenyl Regulations No. 1 (C.R.C. Vol. V, c. S64); Polybrominated Biphenyls Regulations (SOR/79-35 10); Polychlorinated Terphenyls Regulations (SOR/79-369); United
States, Toxic Substances Control Act., 15 U.S.C.S. § 2605. See also UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, SUSPENDED AND CANCELLED PESTICIDES (Oct. 1979).
183. OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PRELIMINARY
ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP COSTS FOR NATIONAL HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEMS 22 (1979). Estimates

of the number of potential hazardous waste sites vary widely. One recent EPA estimate which included
mining-related sites ranged from 130,000 to 378,000 sites. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA's INVENTORY OF POTENTIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES IS INCOMPLETE (Mar. 1985) (GAO/RCED-85-75).
184. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, SUPERFUND STRATEGY (Mar.

1985) (OTA-ITE-253).
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disposal sites have been identified in New Brunswick,'85 3,345 in Ontario, 8 6 760 in Manitoba,' 87 and 1,152 in Alberta.' 8
In addition to information deficiencies concerning the location, quantity, and toxicity of waste in Canada, there are at least two additional
substantive problems associated with jurisdictional issues and the extent
of legislative coverage. It is the view of Environment Canada that "the
jurisdiction for hazardous waste management is primarily a provincial
prerogative." 8 9 This assessment of jurisdictional responsibility appears
based on an interpretation of sections 92(5), (10), (13), and (16) of the
Constitution assigning exclusive provincial power over the management
and sale of public lands, local works and undertaking, property and civil
rights, and "all matters of a merely local or private nature in the Province."
This interpretation favoring a lead provincial role is reflected in the
wording of Section 5 of the federal Environmental Contaminants Act
which reads in part:
5(1) Consultation with provinces and departments or agencies....
the Minister [of the Environment] and the Minister of National Health
and Welfare . . . shall, before making any recommendation to the
Governor in Council ... consult with

(a) the governments of ... provinces ...
(2) Publication of proposed order and regulations. Where after consultation ... [the federal Ministers] are satisfied that the significant
danger referred to .

.

. will not be eliminated by any action taken

or proposed to be taken pursuantto any other law [emphasis added]
...the Minister shall cause to be published in the CanadaGazette
...a copy of the proposed order and regulations. . . . "
185. W.H. CRANDALL & Assoc. MGMT. LTD., IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF CLOSED OR
ABANDONED LAND DISPOSAL SITES IN THE PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK iii-iv (Feb. 1982), (a report
prepared for Environment Canada/Environment New Brunswick). See also

WATER MANAGEMENT
SERVICES LTD., PRELIMINARY FIELD INVESTIGATION OF ABANDONED/CLOSED LAND DISPOSAL SITES

(Mar. 1983) (a report prepared for Environment Canada/Environment New Brunswick).
186. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Site Inventory Study 4(a) (June 1980).
187. I.D. SYSTEMS LTD., IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF ACTIVE AND INACTIVE LAND DISPOSAL
SITES IN MANITOBA iii (Dec. 1982) (report prepared for Environment Canada & Manitoba Dept. of
the Environment).
188. MACLAREN PL.ANsEARcH LAVALIN, IDENTIFICATION AND VERIFICATION OF ACrIvE AND INACTIVE
LAND DISPOSAL SITES IN ALBERTA, PHASE 1 3-3 (1981) (report prepared for Alberta Environment/
Environment Canada). In May 1986, the federal government produced a list of active and inactive
waste disposal sites by jurisdiction and priority for further assessment. Their data were as follows:
BC, 141; Alberta, 1190; Saskatchewan, 1324; Manitoba, 760; Ontario, 220; Quebec, 48; New
Brunswick, 436; P.E.I., 461; Newfoundland, 239; total Canada, 5,493. Environment Canada, State
of the Environment: Report for Canada 186 (May 1986).
189. Environment Canada, Environment Canada's Operating Policy on Hazardous Waste Management 1 (Oct. 29, 1981) (mimeo).
190. S.C. 1974-75, c. 72, §§5(l), (2).
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While legislative activity in the area of toxic waste control is underway,
provincial initiatives have been uneven and incomplete. 9' As the province
which produces approximately half of Canada's toxic waste, Ontario has
been legislating actively in this area. Under regulations to the Ontario
Environmental Protection Act, the lead statute in the realm of toxic chemical control, a waybill or manifest system was established to track the
quantity and nature of industrial waste being moved from pollutant generator to waste management system operators. This regulatory mechanism, also incorporated in the U.S. Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act,"' is an important component of an integrated control strategy. Its
principal deficiency is the omission of waste quantities that are stored or
disposed of on-site rather than transported to disposal locations.' 93 Reliance on waybill data has led to a severe underestimate of the total
quantity of toxic waste generated in Ontario, although it has provided
very useful information for clasification by waste type.' 94
In addition, the province established the Ontario Waste Management
Corporation in 1981 with a mandate: "to research, develop, establish,
operate, and maintain facilities for the transmission, reception, collection,
examination, storage, treatment, and disposal of wastes including sewage.' 95 Ontario's controversial "Spills Bill" 1 96 created an "Environmental
Compensation Corporation" with the authority to recompense victims of
environmental spills.' 97
As of 1984, British Columbia has instituted special waste regulations' 9"
under its Waste Management Act. A "special waste transfer manifest"
system has been adopted where documentation must be provided for the
transportation of fifty-three "specific special wastes" and sixty-one "generic special wastes" when their concentration or total quantity exceeds
prespecified limits.'99 Eight special waste exemption categories have been
created in accordance with the perceived environmental threat posed by
the quantity and/or concentration of each type of waste." The Special
Waste Regulations also require the licensing of all carriers of waste who
meet the manifest criteria.2"'
191. See discussion in CASTRILLI, supra note 177, at 46-71.
192. Pub. L. No. 94-580, Oct. 21, 1971, § 3001(5), § 3003(a)(3). Also cited as 42 U.S.C. 6901
et seq.
193. 3 GORE & STORRIE LTD., supra note 178, at 53.
194. 1 REID, CROWTHER & PARTNERS, LTD. (1980/81) supra note 178, at 235.
195. Ontario Waste Management Corporation Act, 1981 (S.O. 1981, c. 21) § 3(a).
196. See text discussion supra under subheading Liability.
197. S.90, 91.
198. B.C. Reg. 42/84.
199. Schedules 1 and 2.
200. Schedule 3.
201. S.9.
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While assuming a subsidiary role in toxic waste control, the federal
government has exhibited increasing concern over the extent and severity
of this problem. Two pieces of federal legislation could be interpreted as
addressing, at least in part, some of the major issues associated with toxic
wastes. The Environmental Contaminants Act °2 of 1975 deals principally
with the manufacture and import of toxic chemicals. Several aspects of
this legislation appear to hamper its general application, however:2 3 (a)
inadequate requirements for information provision by industry; (b) lack
of a specific focus on storage, disposal, discharges, or spills; (c) inadequate coverage in the sense that toxic substances to be controlled must
be prespecified on an individual or class basis; (d) a prohibitory rather
than managerial emphasis in the language of the act; (e) a potential
inability to fix responsibility in the case of transfers, gifts, or any acts
not amounting to a sale; 2" (f) potential ambiguity associated with exemptions based on "good manufacturing practice";2"5 (g) the possibility
that restricting the inspection of premises to those instances where the
inspector has reason to believe that contravention of the Act has occurred
will limit the capacity of the regulator to encourage better planning and
pollution control; 2' (h) the absence of a requirement for warning labels
on containers used for holding, handling, or storing toxic chemicals;
equipment machinery, or devices in which toxic chemicals are present;
or products that contain a toxic substance; (i) lack of specific reference
to "abandonment" of toxic substances or equipment as a possible form
of "release"; (j) a focus on chemical compounds to the exclusion of
elemental chemicals; (k) inconsistency in the penalties which could induce
a polluter to obstruct an inspector rather than risk a higher fine for the
release of toxic chemicals to the environment; and (1) ambiguity in the
wording of Section 10 concerning inspection which would frustrate the
capacity of an inspector to examine relevant documents kept off site.
These potential shortcomings, or "loopholes," provide an apt demonstration of the need for extremely careful policy formulation and legislative drafting in the area of environmental control. While it can be
argued that such omissions or ambiguities plague all legislation, the threat
202. S.C. 1974-75, c. 72.
203. CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW Ass'N. & CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW RESEARCH
FOUNDATION, ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS ON TOXIC CHEMICALS LAW AND POLICY IN CANADA (1981)

(proceedings of a seminar held on June 15-16, 1981, at Toronto, Ontario); ENVIRONMENT CANADA/
HEALTH AND WELFARE CANADA, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINANTS BOARD OF REVIEW REPORT ON

PCBs (POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS) (Mar. 1980). See also Susan Tanner, Selected Environmental

Statutes (Feb. 1984) (unpublished study paper for The Law Reform Comm'n. of Canada, Protection
of Life Project); R.H. HALL & D.A. CHANT, ECOTOXiCrrY: RESPONSIBILITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES (Aug.

1979) (Canadian Environmental Advisory Council Rep. No. 8)
204. S8.
205. S 8(3).
206. S 10(1).
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of excessive toxic chemical release entails unusually high social costs.
Despite these shortcomings, many of which could be remedied by minor
legislative amendments, the Act has already been successfully used to
ban many or all uses of the following major toxic chemicals: Polychlorinated Biphenyls;2 °7 Mirex; °8 Polybrominated Biphenyls;2° Polychlorinated Terphenyls; 1 ° and Chlorofluorcarbons. 21 '
The second major piece of federal legislation which relates to toxic
chemicals is the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act. 2 ' One comprehensive study2" 3 of hazardous waste management in Canada concludes
that several significant ambiguities may constrain the capacity of this Act
to meet the rigorous demands of toxic waste control. Specifically mentioned is inadequate coverage of the Act with respect to disposal facilities
under provincial jurisdictional control, and the potential inadequacy of
criteria for assessing the environmental threat of specific wastes.
In sum, the control of toxic chemicals and wastes in Canada appears
to be lagging behind American regulatory developments. While, in the
aggregate, Canadian toxic waste generation is significantly lower than
U.S. totals, there is no reason to expect major qualitative differences in
the nature of the problems faced by both countries. Fortunately, some of
the more toxic chemicals, such as 2,4,5-trichlorophenol, have never been
produced in Canada.21 4 This does not preclude, however, an environmental threat from their use and disposal. In addition, a focus on aggregate
quantities of waste may tend to mask potentially extreme localized hazards.
Three research reports sponsored by the Canadian federal government
provide supporting evidence of major regulatory deficiencies in toxic
waste control.2" 5 The information base which is essential to the process
C.R.C., Vol. V. c. 564; SOR/78-153; SOR/80-461.
SOR/78-891, SOR/78-892.
SOR/79-351.
SOR/79-369.
SOR/80-254; SOR/81-365.
S.C. 1980, c. 36.
213. CASTRILLI, supra note 177.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

214. CANADA, INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMrIrEE ON TOXIC CHEMICALS, supra note 181, at iii.

215. "Current disposal practices are inadequate and no economical, accessible and environmentally acceptable disposal facilities exist for the proper disposal of hazardous wastes in [Western
Canada]." WARDRUP & AssoC., supra note 178, at 1-1.
"The existing hazardous waste management system is deficient, and there is a need to upgrade
all parts of the system immediately. The deficiencies are disturbing in view of the potential hazards
associated with the wastes." REID, CROWrHER & PARTNERS (1980/81), supra note 178, at ii.

"The existing transportation and disposal systems are inadequate, poorly regulated and are not
The list of poor practices includes: mixing of unknown
subject to comprehensive monitoring ....
waste types within a transport load, concealment of hazardous wastes as refuse wastes, poor equipment maintenance, lack of driver training, disposal of wastes in unsuitable areas, and a lack of
comprehensive leachate monitoring systems at landfill sites." REID, CROWTHER & PARTNERS (1980),
supra note 178, at ii.
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of regulatory design and implementation appears less complete in Canada
than in the United States and an inadequate transfer of this information
is occurring. For example, one province recently considered plans for a
hazardous waste landfill program, although this practice is now considered
unacceptable for many types of waste in the United States.21 6 The current
state of toxic waste control in Canada might well be summarized by the
comments of a U.S. EPA official who, on a visit to Canada, expressed
the concern that weak Canadian laws could make that country the "beneficiary of a lot of the U.S.'s hazardous waste. "217
InternationalIssues in Environmental Control
Water Quality. Canada and the United States have a long record of
mutual accommodation and agreement in the area of transboundary water
pollution. Cooperation under the Boundary Waters Treaty218 of 1909 was
further enhanced by the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements" 9 of 1972
and 1978. These last two accords were designed to create an effective
international effort to halt and reverse the serious deterioration of water
quality in the world's largest body of fresh water. The magnitude of the
problem can be gauged by the enormous environmental stresses placed
on the Great Lakes by the proximity of high levels of both population
and industrial activity. Aside from the traditional pollutants associated
with domestic waste, there is a profusion of more exotic and toxic waste
streams as byproducts of manufacturing.
The U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), in its
Toxic Substances List of 1974, identified 42,000 toxic chemical substances
in use. Remarkable as the extent of this listing may be, even more
noteworthy was HEW's observation that the 1974 volume included "approximately 5,000 new chemical compounds which had not appeared in
the 1973 Edition." 2 0 This continuing pattern of new chemical development and use was further documented in the successor to the Toxic SubstancesList, the 1981-82 Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances
which, in listing 59,224 different chemicals, stated that: ". . . this edition
includes approximately 14,000 new chemical compounds . ..that did
216. House Votes Rougher Rules Dealing with Toxic Wastes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1983, at I13,
col. 1; Toxic Waste Feared, The Province, Feb. 13, 1984, at C6, col. 2; Waste Policy Termed Threat
to Water, Globe & Mail, Feb. 14, 1984, at 3, col. 1; U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL (Mar. 1983); and
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, UNITED STATES CONGRESS,
RECENT CHANGES AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES (May 1985).

217.
218.
219.
220.

HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT:

Toxic Waste Feared, The Province, Feb. 12, 1984, at C6, col. 2.
36 Stat. 2448; TS 548; Bevans 319.
T.I.A.S. 7312, 7747; 23 U.S.T. 301; 24 U.S.T. 2268 and 30 U.S.T. 1383; T.I.A.S. 9257.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES LIST,

1974 EDITION vii (June 1974).
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not appear in the 1980 Registry." 221 Many of these chemicals are produced
in relatively small quantities, but the level of environmental impact is
frequently unrelated to total production and emissions. Levels of toxicity
range by at least five orders of magnitude among identified hazards to
the human species. For example, the LD5 0 for DDT is 100mg/kg and for
dioxin (TCBDB) is 0.001 mg/kg.222
Research conducted by the Great Lakes Water Quality Board on behalf
of the IJC has identified at least 800 complex organic chemical contaminants in the Great Lakes system.223 Joint programs have been initiated
to control municipal discharges, urban drainage, industrial effluent, and
other point and non-point sources on both Canadian and American territory. Table 14 summarizes compliance with municipal pollution abatement requirements under Article VII-7a of the 1978 agreement. While
significant instances of noncompliance remain, the problem with respect
to municipally generated biochemical oxygen demand, suspended solids,
and phosphorous seems well on the way to solution.
A potentially greater threat to the environment is posed by several more
toxic industry-related pollutants whose concentration, after earlier regulatory-induced reduction, appears to be on the increase. To quote the 1983
report of the Great Lakes Water Quality Board:
In recent years the Board reported a general decline in the levels of
concentration of PCBs, DDT, mercury and other contaminants in
fish flesh and bird eggs during the 1970s. This year, based upon the
most recent data (1981 and 1982) the Board reports that the decreasing concentration trend for many of these contaminants appears to
have ended in some lakes and in some cases concentrations may be
increasing again. 4
A certain degree of political friction over international water quality
has recently developed between Canada and the United States. A major
issue is the nature and extent of remedial action required to reduce or
eliminate current and potential discharges of toxic chemicals from in225
dustrial waste dumps near the Niagara River which feeds Lake Ontario.
221. U.S.

Toxic EFFECTS
iv (10th ed. June 1983).
222. T.A. LOOMIS, ESSENTIALS OF TOXICOLOGY 18 (2d ed. 1974). Note: LD50 is the concentration
of a pollutant which is lethal to 50 percent of tested organisms within a prespecified time such as
96 hours. TCDBD is 2,3,6,7 tetrachlorodibenzodioxin, considered one of the most toxic members
of the dioxin family.
223. GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BOARD, 1983 REPORT ON GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY 5
(Nov. 1983) (report to the International Joint Commission).
224. Id. at 7.
225. Stiff Note Sent to U.S. over 'Bandaid'Plan to Clean Up Dump Site, Globe & Mail, Mar.
17, 1984, at 20, col.4. For discussion on the nature and extent of pollution, see K.W. Kuntz,
Contaminants in the Bottom Sediments of the Niagara River-May 1981 (May 1982) (mimeo, Water
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NOISH, REGISTRY OF

OF CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES
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Table 14. Municipal Compliance with Final Statutory Effluent Requirements under Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (1981)
(percent of plants in compliance)

Country
Canada
United States

No. of Plants

BOD

Suspended
Solids

Total
Phosphorous

105
285

94%
71%

91%
75%

70%
65%

Great Lakes Water Quality Board, 1983Report on Great Lakes Water Quality (Report to the I.J.C. Nov. 1983); and Great Lakes
Water Quality Board, Review of the Municipal Pollution Abatement Programs in the Great Lakes Basin 97 (Nov. 1983).

Other sources of recent concern are the lack of sufficient American support
for and involvement in the work of the IJC, and the United States'
difficulty in meeting its commitments under the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement.226
It appears that the pollution situation in the Great Lakes Basin is not
yet under control, a conclusion strongly supported by a joint study of the
U.S. National Research Council and Royal Society of Canada,227 as well
2 29
as recent reports of the IJC2 28 and Niagara River Toxics Committee.
What is most unsettling is that the information base is still not broad
enough either to enable an accurate assessment of the nature and extent
of the total environmental damage or provide a program of action which
can guarantee, with any reasonable degree of confidence, significant remedial results in a predetermined time frame.
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement has led to an extensive
Quality Branch, Environment Canada); Maguire, Kuntz & Hale, ChlorinatedHydrocarbonsin the
Surface Microlayer of the Niagara River, 9-2 J. GREAT LAKES RES. 281 (1983); Kuntz & Warry,

Chlorinated Organic Contaminants in Water and Suspended Sediments of the Lower Niagara River,
9-2 J. GREAT LAKES RES. 241 (1983); Elder, Proctor & Hites, Organic Compounds Found Near
Dump Sites in Niagara Falls, New York, 15- 10 ENVTL. Scl. & TECH. 1237 (Oct. 1981); INTERNATIONAL
JOINT COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT UNDER THE 1978 GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT
ON POLLUTION IN THE NIAGARA RIVER (Jan. 20, 1981); and GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY BOARD,
1983 REPORT ON GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY, APPENDIX A, AREAS OF CONCERN IN THE GREAT
LAKES BASIN (Mar. 1984) (Update of Class A Areas, report to the IJC); THE NIAGARA RIVER ToxiCs
COMMITTEE, REPORT (Oct. 1984). See also Minister Defends Cleanup Record, Globe & Mail, May
16, 1986, at A9, col.1.
226. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A MORE COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH IS NEEDED TO CLEAN UP THE GREAT LAKES (May 21, 1982) (report to the Congress of
the United States); and U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION WATER
QUALITY ACTIVITIES NEED GREATER U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND INVOLVEMENT (June 23, 1982)

(report to the Secretary of State).
227. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL

OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF CANADA,

THE GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT: AN EVOLVING INSTUMENT FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT (1985).

228. INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, SECOND BIENNIAL REPORT UNDER THE GREAT LAKES
WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT OF 1978 TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
AND THE STATES AND PROVINCES OF THE GREAT LAKES BASIN (Dec. 31, 1984).

229.

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION, ENVIRONMENT CANADA,

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, & ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, REPORT OF
THE NIAGARA RIVER ToxICs COMMITTEE (Oct. 1984).
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program of research in an attempt to close the imposing gap in the current
state of ecological knowledge. For example, the Science Advisory Board
has concluded that "there is no adequate information on the extent of
groundwater contamination in the Great Lakes Basin." 23 Nevertheless,
there is sufficient information available on surface water quality for the
Great Lakes Water Quality Board to conclude that "the extent of chemical
contamination in the Great Lakes .. .can only be viewed as pervasive. "23 Part of the problem appears to be that "there is no overall Great
Lakes toxic substances management strategy to assist jurisdictions in
coordinating the development and implementation of their management
programs." 232 Economic constraints aggravate the problem of inadequate
regulatory resources in environmental control as they do in most other
policy areas. What is less clear is the extent of the impact of political
constraints on the achievement of effective international environmental
control. In no area is the ambiguous role of political factors more apparent
than in the field of transboundary air pollution.
Air Quality. Bilateral accommodation on issues of air quality dates
back to the landmark Trail smelter dispute of 1926-34 when sulphur
dioxide fumes from the world's largest lead-zinc smelter at Trail, British
Columbia damaged farms and orchards in part of the U.S. Pacific Northwest.233 Technological changes undertaken by the smelter in response to
this international problem led to the development of a major fertilizer
industry in the province. Sulphur dioxide is once again the focus of
international attention, albeit at a much higher level of intensity.
Of major environmental concern is the generation and long-range transport of oxides of sulphur and nitrogen, considered the principal precursors
of acidic precipitation. Table 15 summarizes Canadian and American
emissions by industrial category. In the aggregate, and across most categories, Canadian emissions are dwarfed by their American counterparts.
An important exception to this American predominance in 'emissions is
the non-ferrous smelter industry where Canada possesses the largest pointsource of sulphur dioxide emissions in North America. 234 Table 16 presents
a comparison of major point-sources on the North American continent.
Acidic precipitation, or "acid rain," poses a major environmental threat
to both Canada and the United States. A recent House of Commons report,
in its first sentence, summarized the Canadian attitude toward this prob230. GREAT LAKES SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT xii (Nov. 1983) (report to
the IJC).
231. GREAT LAKES WATER QuALTY BOARD, supra note 223, at 8.
232. Id. at 6.
233. See Murray, supra note 49.
234. See, e.g., ONrARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, SUDBURY ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY 19731980 SYNOPISS (1982).
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Table 15. Summary of SOxand NOx Discharges in Canadaand the United States(in metric tons)
SO

NO

Canada1979

USA 1980"

Canada1979

USA 1980"

Utilities

0.7

17.7

0.3

5.6

Industrial boilers/
processheaters/
residential
commercial

1.0

6.6

0.5

6.4

Non-ferrous smelters

2.0

1.8

-

-

Transportation

0.1

0.8

1.0

8.2

Iron ore processing

0.2

-

-

-

Other

0.8

-

0.2

Total

4.8

26.9

-

2.0

20.2

*estimated.
Still Waters,the Chilling Reality of Acid Rain, Report of the Subcomm. on Acid Rain of the House of Commons Standing Comm.on
Fisheries and Forestry (1981). For additional information, seeEnvironment Canada,Stateof the Environment: Report for Canada
167(1986).
Table 16. Major SO2PointSources in North America (M tons/year)
Rank

Quantity

Source
INCO Ltd.
Noranda Mines
TVA, Paradise
INCO Ltd.
Muskingum (OH Power)
Gavin
Phelps Dodge
TVA, Cumberland
Monroe
Clifty Creek (IN &
KY Elec. Corp.)
Gibson
Baldwin (IL Power)
Union Elec., Labadie
Hudson Bay Mining &
Smelting
Ohio Valley Elec.
Kyger Creek
Georgia Power, Bowen
Conesville
Ohio Power, Mitchell
ASARCO
West Penn. Power,
Hatfield
New Madrid
OH Edison Co., Sammis
Ont. Hydro (Lambton)
GA Power Co., Wansley
Homer City
TVA, Jobnsonville
Ont. Hydro (Nanticoke)
AL Power Co., E.C. Gaston
Magma Copper
Algoma Steel Corp.
Falconbridge Nickel
Mines
Anaconda Copper
Phelps Dodge
Suncor, Inc.
Ont. Hydro (Lakeview)

Type

Location

smelter
smelter
utility
smelter
utility
utility
smelter
utility
utility
utility

Copper Ciff, ONT
Noranda, QUE
Kentucky
Thompson, MAN
Ohio
Ohio
E. Douglas, AZ
Chattanooga, TN
Michigan
Indiana

utility
utility
utility
smelter

Indiana
Illinois
Missouri
Flin Flon. MAN

utility

Ohio

utility
utility
utility
smelter
utility

Georgia
Ohio
West Virginia
Hayden, AZ
Pennsylvania

utility
utility
utility
utility
utility
utility
utility
utility
smelter
smelter
smelter

Missouri
Ohio
Courtright, ONT
Georgia
Pennsylvania
Tennessee
Walpole Twns'p, ONT
Alabama
San Manuel, AZ
Wawa, ONT
Falconbridge, ONT

smelter
smelter
refinery
utility

Montana
Morenci, AZ
Ft. McMurray, ALTA
Mississauga, ONT

Still Waters,the Chilling Reality of Acid Rain, Report of the Subcomm. on Acid Rain of the House of Commons Standing Comm.on
Fisheries and Forestry 24, 103 (1981); U.S.E.P.A. computer databank information, and Ont. Ministry of the Environment, A
Submission to the United StatesEnvironmental Protection Agency Opposing Relaxation of SO2Emission Limits in StateImplementation Plansand Urging Enforcement (Mar. 12, 1981,Expanded Mar. 27, 1981).
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lem: "Canada is facing the greatest environmental threat in the 114 years
of our existence as a nation.""'
Bilateral recognition of the severity of this problem led to the signing,
on August 5, 1980, of a Memorandum of Intent between Canada and the
United States concerning transboundary air pollution.236 This agreement
initiated a major combined research effort in an area marked by pervasive
scientific uncertainty and a profound lack of information on fundamental
meteorological, chemical, and biological phenomena. The conclusions
which have emerged from many of the studies to date offer no justification
for complacency.237 As indicated in Tables 15 and 16, large sources of
sulphur oxide emissions are associated with smelters and fossil fuel combustion in thermal power plants. There is a large concentration of this
activity in the northeast quadrant of North America, particularly associated
with high population density and resulting electric power requirements.
Because of prevailing winds and the large American population in this
area, "about 3 to 4 times as much sulphur, on an annual average basis,
moves across the border from the United States to Canada than moves
in the opposite direction." 238 The effect of these emissions appears to be
potentially serious in both countries. The recent Impact Study of the
Bilateral Assessment Group presents a detailed listing of aquatic, agricultural, and forest resources at risk in Canada and the United States.239
Summary data are presented in Table 17.
Additional studies have been undertaken by provincial governments
most affected by acid rain and its associated ions and compounds such
HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 45, at 11.
T.I.A.S. 9856.
See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (1981), supra note 45; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
supra note 45; CANADA/UNITED STATES, MEMORANDUM OF INTENT ON TRANSBOUNDARY AIR
POLLTwON, IMPACT ASSESSMENT WORK GROUP 1, FINAL REPORT (Jan. 1983); COMMITTEE ON MONrTORING

235.
236.
237.
(1983),

AND ASSESSMENT OF TRENDS IN ACID DEPOSITION, ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACID DEPOSITION, LONG-TERM TRENDS (1986); PHILIP ROTH, CHARLES BLANCHARD,
JOHN HARTE, HARVEY MICHAELS & MOHAMED T. EL-ASHRY, THE AMERICAN WEST'S ACID RAIN TEST
(Mar. 1985) (World Resources Institute Research Rep. No. I); UNITED STATES OFFICE OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, REPORT OF THE ACID RAIN PEER REVIEW PANEL (July 1984); and AD Hoc
COMM. ON ACID RAIN: SCIENCE AND POLICY, IS THERE SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS ON ACID RAIN? (Aug.

1985) (excerpts from six governmental reports, Mary Flagler Cary Charitable Trust, Cary Arboretum,
Milbrook NY).
238. HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 45, at 13. See also Ontario Ministry of the Environment,
Presentation to the Air Pollution Control Board of the State of Indiana in Opposition to the IndianaKentucky Electric Generating Station Petition to Operate with an Increase in its Sulphur Dioxide
Emissions to 7.52 Pounds of SO 2 per Million BTU's of Heat Input (Oct. 7, 1981). American
acknowledgement of the potentially destructive effect of U.S. air pollutant emissions on the Canadian
environment is provided in letters from Douglas M. Costle, the former Administrator of the U.S.
EPA, to Senator George Mitchell (Jan. 13, 1981) and Edmund S. Muskie, former Secretary of State
(Jan. 13, 1981).
239. CANADA/UNITED STATES, MEMORANDUM OF INTENT ON TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION,
IMPACT ASSESSMENT WORK GROUP 1 FINAL REPORT (Jan. 1983) [hereinafter referred to as FINAL
REPORT].
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Table 17. Resourcesat Risk from Acidic Precipitation
Resource

6 EastCanadian provinces

Aquatic
(surface water)

EasternUnited States

2

52,000 km in area with sulphate deposition
greater than 20 kg/ha/yr

2

36,000 km (or 25%of surface water) is in areas
of high and moderate sensitivity anddeposition
greater than 20 kg/ha/yr

2

28,00 km of this is inareawith high sensitivity
Agriculture

for 6 of 12 most valuable crops, more than 50%
are grown in areaswith deposition greater than
40 kg/ha/yr

of major crops, only soy beansand tobacco have
as much as 20% yield in areaswith deposition
greater than 40 kg/ha/yr

Forests

approx. 10% of hardwood growth. I% of softwood growth and 8% of mixed growth in areas
with deposition greater than 40 kg/ha/yr

approx. 10% of combined hardwood and softwood growth in areas with deposition greater
than 40 kg/ha/yr
greater than 75%of growth is in areaswith deposition between 20-40 kg/ha/yr

Canada/United StatesImpact Assessment Work Group 1, Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution, Final Report 1-21,
1-22 (Jan. 1983). For additional information on the effect of air pollutants on natural resources, see U.S. Office of Technology
Assessment, Acid Rain andTransported Air Pollutants-Implications for Public Policy 79-101 (esp. ch. 5, Regional Distribution of
Risks) (June1984).

as H 2SO 4, HNO 3, S04= , NO 3-, and NH 4 + . Estimates of current and

potential dangers vary, but in Ontario, for example, as many as 4,600
lakes are already considered as being acidified and 48,000 more are
considered at risk.24°
Under amendments to Canada's Clean Air Act in December 1980, the
Minister of the Environment is empowered to act, subject to consultation
with the provinces, if air pollution ".

.

. may reasonably be expected to

contribute a significant danger to the health, safety or welfare of persons
in a country other than Canada." 241 The passage of this amendment by
the Canadian government effectively operationalizes Section 115 of the
United States' Clean Air Act which, subject to reciprocal foreign legislation, requires the EPA to force any state government to reduce air
pollution2 42deemed to endanger public health and welfare in that foreign
country.
The policy and regulatory responses adopted by Canada and the United
States appear to have significant differences. Table 18 summarizes some
recent major initiatives on the subject of acid rain. The Canadian government has taken a much more aggressive stance with regard to the
timing and magnitude of control measures for sulphur oxide emissions.
In contrast it has been the position of the United States government, as
240.

LEGISLATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO,

supra note 93, at 31;

FISHERIES AND OCEANS

CANADA, ACID RAIN: A PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF THE RISK TO ONTARIO'S INLAND FISHERIES iii (Nov.
1981) (estimate prepared by C.K. Minns); ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT, ACID SENSITIVITY
OF LAKES IN ONTARIO (1983) (Acidic Precipitation in Ontario Study); and Ontario Ministry of the

Environment, A Submission to the United States Environmental Protection Agency Opposing Relaxation of S02 Emission Limits in State Implementation Plans and Urging Enforcement (Mar. 12,
1981, expanded Mar. 27, 1981).
241. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 47, s. 21.1(l).
242. Formerly 42 U.S.C. 1857 et seq. s. 115; now 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.
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Table 18. Some Major Canadian and American Initiatives Concerning Acid Rain
July 26-27, 1978

First meeting of the United States-Canada Research Consultation Group on the Long-Range Transport of
Air Pollutants.'

July 26, 1979

Canadaand United StatesIssueJoint Statement on Transboundary Air Quality.

June30, 1980

United StatespassesAcid Precipitation Act which establishes a 10-year research program.'
Canada and United Statessign Memorandum of Intent.d

b

August 5, 1980
September 20, 1980

Ontario passesregulation for phased reductions in SO2emissions from INCO's Copper Cliff smelter at
Sudbury.'

March 12, 1981

Ontario submits legal and scientific brief to U.S. EPAasking that agency stop six stateswho wanted to
lower standards for sulphur emissions from coal-fired power plants.

January 14, 1981

Quebec implements regulations concerning ambient levels of S02 and other air pollutants.a
Canadaestablished national guidelines for thermal power generation emissions.h

May 2, 1981
June 1982

Ontario imposes phasedreduction in SO2 and NO5 emissions from Ontario Hydro's fossil-fueled electric
generating stations.'

July 26, 1982

Quebec and New York Statesign agreement to coordinate research efforts andreduce acid precipitation)t

September 29, 1983

The Canadian Council of Resource and Environment Ministers agreeon a target reduction of 25% in
sulphur emissions east of the Manitoba/Saskatchewan border by 1990. A further 25% cut was to be
contingent upon a parallel American response.'

December 12, 1983

New Brunswick implements regulations concerning sulphur content of fuel as well as ground level concentrations of NO. andSO.1

March 6, 1984

Canada's federal andprovincial environment ministers agreed upon a unilateral 50% reduction of emissions
in Eastern Canada by 1994.'

March 20, 1984

Complaint filed by the State of New York et al. against the U.S. EPA for failure to implement the
international and interstate provisions of the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, 7415, 7426.

March 21, 1984

Canada cosigns a ten-country agreement to cut national S02 emissions by at least 30% before 1993and
to make substantial reductions in NO. by this date.'

August 14, 1984

Governor Mario pCuomo announced signing of statelaw to require reductions in the emissions of SO2in
New York State.
Canadian environment ministers announce a partial agreement to sharethe cleanup costs of acid rain.q

February 5, 1985
February 6. 1985

Quebec government introduces new regulations to control smelter and automobile emissions. The focus
of the smelter controls is the Home smelter in northwest Quebec andthe Murdochville smelter both owned
by Noranda Mines. The Quebec government is attempting to comply with a federal-provincial agreement
to limit SO2emissions to 29 kg/ha/yr.'

March 7, 1985

Canadian government announced $150 million grant to the Canadian smelting industry to help defray the
cost of sulphur dioxide reduction. Canada also announced tighter motor-vehicle emission standards for
cars and light-duty trucks to come into effect in the fall of 1987.These new standards, the sameas those
already in force in the United States, are intended to reduce NO emissions by 45%.'

March 17, 18, 1985

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Reaganmeet at -Shamrock Summit" in Quebec City and
appoint two special envoys to study acid rain problem.'

June18, 1985

Agreement to reduce S02 emissions by 32% over 9 years was adopted by New England governors and
eastern Canadian premiers meetings27in St. Andrews, Nova Scotia.'

May I I, 1985

Quebec and Massachusetts agreeto develop a joint program for the control of acid rain.

July 11, 1985

Canada, along with 20 other countries, signs Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution [of 1979] to reduce national annual sulphur emissions or the transbounday flow of these
emissions by at least 30% of 1980 levels by 1993.w

December 5, 1985

Seven statesfile a suit in New York charging the U.S. EPA with violating the Clean Air Act by failing to
obey requirements to update SO pollution standards.'

December 17, 1985

Ontario announces new regulations under the provincial Environmental Protection Act that will force as
much as a 67% reduction of air pollution emissions from INCO, Ontario Hydra, Algoma Steel and
y
Falconbridge Ltd.

December 19, 1985

B.C. announces signing of an agreement with Washington Stateto coordinate studies and approaches to
acid rain.'

January 8, 1986

U.S.-Canada Acid Rain Study delivered."

January 18, 1986

Six-state acid rain caucus formed to promote acid-rain control legislation at the statelevel. The six states
represented at the meeting in Carlisle, PA, were Pennsylvania. Maine, Rhode Island, Virginia, New York,
andMinnesota.t
Table 18.continued

v

602

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

March 18, 1986

New legislative initiative announced by Senator Robert T. Stafford, chairman of the Environment and
Pubic Works committee, to curb nationwide emissions of carbon monoxide, ozone, NO., and SO2.The
estimated cost of compliance is $6 billion."

March 19, 1986

President Reagan,meeting with Prime Minister Mulroney, endorsesCanada-U.S. acid rain report!"

a. A.P. Altshuller andG.A. McBean, The LRTAP Problem in North America: A Preliminary Overview, prepared by the United
States-Canada
ResearchConsultation Group on the Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants, 1979.
b. Ottawa, Washington, reach accord on air, Globe and Mail, July 27, 1979,at 9.
c. Title VII of Energy Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §8901-12, June30. 1980,Pub. L. 96-294.
d. T.I.A.S. 9856.
e. 0. Reg. 712/80; cited in consolidated regulations asR.R.O. 1980Reg. 301.
f. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, A Submission to the United StatesEnvironmental Protection Agency Opposing Relaxation
of SO2Emission Limits in StateImplementation Plansand Urging Enforcement, (Mar. 12, 1981, Expanded Mar. 27, 1981).
g. O.C. 3843-80 (1981), 113G.O. 11.51;R.R.Q. 1981, c. Q-2, Reg. 20.
h. CanadaGazette, part I, May 2/81.
i. 0. Reg. 7/82. Made December 23, 1981,filed January 14, 1982,gazetted January 30, 1982.
j. New YorkJoins Quebec in a Pact on Acid Fallout. N.Y. Times, July 27, 1982,at I1. col. 3.
k. Environment Ministers get plan 'with punch'for acid rain cleanup, Globe and Mail, Sept. 30, 1983,at 1.
1. N.B. Reg. 83-208.
m. Canada decides to go it alone in acid rain fight, Globe andMail. Mar. 22. 1984,atl.
n. United StatesDistrict Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 84-0853.
a. Canada, 9 others sign acid rain pact, Globe and Mail, Mar. 22, 1984,atl.
p. Cuomo Announces Signing of a Law to Curb Acid Rain, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1984,at 1.
q. Acid rain agreement hailed as victory: Eastern provinces to find joint approach, Globe and Mail, Feb. 6, 1985,at 1.
r. O.C. 240-85. Filed February 6, 1985,gazetted February 27, effective March 9. R.R.Q. 1981,c. Q-2, Reg. 20.
s. Up to $150 million slated for cleanup of smelting finns, Globe and Mail, Mar. 7, 1985,at 5.
t. Mulroney, Reagan name acid rain envoys. Globe and Mail, Mar. 18, 1985, at I.
u. Acid rain pact sets32% emissions cut, Globe and Mail, June 18, 1985,at 3.
v. Quebec and Massachusetts to collaborate in fight against acid rain, Globe and Mail, May II. 1985.at 3.
w. Canada signs accord to reduce pollution. Globe and Mail, July 11, 1985,at 10.
x. E.P.A. Is Accused of Violating Law. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1985,at I, col. 17.
y. Ontario's new laws on acid rain 'tough message'for Washington, Globe and Mail, Dec. 18, 1985.
z. B.C., Washington sign acid rain pact, Globe and Mail, Dec, 19, 1985,at Al l.
an. Drew Lewis andWilliam Davis, Joint Report of The Special Envoys on Acid Rain, January 1986.
bb. Six U.S. states unite to push acid-rain laws, Globe and Mail, Jan. 25, 1986.
cc. Senators Back $6 Billion Plan to Combat Acid Rain in U.S.. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1986.
dd. Reagan with Canadian, Backs Two-Nation Report on Acid Rain, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1986.

reflected in recent decisions to postpone emission curtailments,2 43 that
inadequate information has existed to warrant regulatory activity of this
nature. In explicitly recognizing this need for further research, the Canadian House of Commons Study, nevertheless, concluded that:
[tihere is, however, a persistent danger that this legitimate need could
be subverted into a substitute for the difficult decisions that ultimately
will have to be taken. A substantial body of respected scientific
opinion already supports the conclusion that the best available technologies should be implemented as quickly as possible to control
emissions at source [original emphasis]. 2"

What appears to be the existence of a major philosophical and political
difference between the two countries is cogently illustrated by parallel
but not identical conclusions of the Canadian and American Work Group
on Impact Assessment established after the 1980 Memorandum of In243. Ruckelshaus Puts Off Plan to Curb Acid Rain, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1983 at 27(L), col. 1;
EPA Head Backs Reagan on Acid Rain Program, Globe & Mail, Feb. 2, 1984, at 16, col.3. See
also de Saillan, Acid Rain, Canada, and the United States: Enforcing the International Pollution
Provisions of the Clean Air Act, I BOSTON U. INT'L. L.J. 151 (Spring 1982).
244. HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 45, at 15.
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Table 19. Contrasting Conclusions of Canadian andAmerican Working Groups on Impact Assessment of Transboundary Air Pollution
"Aquatic Ecosystem EffectsUnited States"

"Aquatic Ecosystem Effects-Canada"

Basedon theresults of the empirical studies, interpretation of
long-term water quality data, studies of sediment coresand
models that have beenreviewed, we conclude that acidic dephas causedlong-termnand short-term acidification of
osition
sensitive (low alkalinity) surface waters in Canadaand the U.S.
The Work Group concludes on the basis of our understanding
of the acidification processthat reductions from present levels
of total sulphur deposition in someareas would reduce further
damage to sensitive (low alkalinity) surface waters and would
leadto eventual recovery of thosewaters that havealready been
altered chemically or biologically. Loss of genetic stock would
not be reversible.

Basedon the results of the empirical studies, interpretation of
long-term water quality data and studies of sediment cores that
have been reviewed, we conclude that acidic deposition has
causedlong-term and short-term acidification of some low alkalinity surface waters in Canadaandthe U.S. Based on our
understanding of the acidification process the Work Group concludes that reductions from present levels of total sulphur deposition would reducefurther chemical and biological alterations
to low alkalinity surface waters currently experiencing effects
and would lead to eventual recovery of thosewaters that have
been altered by deposition.

The Canadian members of the Work Group propose that present
deposition of sulphate in precipitation be reduced to less than
20 kglhalyr in order to protect all but the most sensitive aquatic
ecosystemsin Canada. In those areas where there is a high
potential to reduce acidity and surface alkalinity is gegerally
greater than 200 AeqlL,the Canadian members recognize that
a higher loading rate is acceptable.

The U.S. members conclude that reductions of pH, loss of
alkalinity, and associated biological changes have occurred in
areas receiving acidic deposition, but cause and effect relationships have often not beenclearly established. The relative
contributions of acidic inputs from the atmosphere, land use
changes. and natural terrestrial processes are not known. The
key terrestrial processes which provide acidity to the aquatic
systemsand/or ameliorate atmospheric acidic inputs are neither
quantified. The key chemical and biological
known or [sic]
to determine the
processes which interact in aquatic ecosystems
chemical environment are notknown or quantified. Based on
the status of the scientific knowledge, the U.S. Work Group
concludes that it is not now possible to derive quantitative
loading effects relationships."

As loading reductions take place and additional information is
gathered on precipitation, surface water chemistry and watershed response, it may be possible to refine regional loading
requirements."

Source: United States-Canada, Memorandum of Intent on Transboundary Air Pollution, Impact Assessment Work Group 1, Final
Report. January 1983, pages 1-7and I-l.

tent.245 Table 19 reproduces the summary paragraphs of both groups with
divergent wording marked in italics. The Canadian proposals for action
contrast sharply with the American preoccupation with information deficiencies and an elusive, if not impossible, search for scientific certainty.
Indeed, scientific research suggests that the Canadian recommendations
for target loadings of wet sulphate deposition-target levels considered
unnecessary by the United States- may be insufficiently restrictive to
prevent significant environmental damange.246

A continuing difference of positions by Canada and the United States
on the problem of acid rain is manifested in the Joint Envoy's Report
delivered in January 1986.247 Table 20, in a manner analagous to Table
19, highlights the divergent viewpoints on such critical issues as the
expected course of acidification, the role of the U.S. Clean Air Act, the
adequacy of the current scientific data base, and the interpretation of
historical emission trends. The recommendations of the Joint Report fall
into three general categories. The first, and most important, is that
245. FINAL REPORT, supra note 239, at 1-7, 1-11.
246. Gorham, Martin & Litzau, Acid Rain: Ionic Correlationsin the Eastern United States 198081 SCIENCE 407 (July 27, 1984).
247. Drew Lewis & William Davis, Joint Report of the Special Envoys on Acid Rain (Jan. 1986).
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Table 20. Contrasting Positions andInterpretations of the Canadian and American Envoys on Acid Rain
Canada

United States

p. 20. "At current ratesof emission of acid-forming pollutants,
acidification of sensitive environments will continue even if
there is no increase in total emissions."

p. 12. "On the basis of this survey data [concerning lake acidification) alone itcannot be predicted what future acidification,
if any, would occur if current levels of deposition were to
continue."

p. 24. "Canada believes the U.S. Clean Air Act affords opportunities, through implemented or as yet unused regulatory
mechanisms, to take significant stepstoward reducing emissions
of acid gases."

pp. 15-16. "The Clean Air Act,as presently written, is not an
especially good tool for controlling transoundary air pollution
• ..the Clean Air Act may not provide adequateprotection for
acid-sensitive ecosystems."

p. 18. "Canadians generally havefound very persuasive both
the scientific findings and the urgent call for action by many of
thesescientists."

p. 18. "The United Statesis committed to act to control acid
rain once it is reasonably certain that that action will achieve
its intended results, and thoseresults will justify the social and
economic costs entailed."

p. 20. "There is consensus in the international scientific community that the scientific data base is adequate to assessthe
immediate as well asthe long-term implications of continuing,
high-volume emissions of acid-causing pollutants and resulting
acidification of sensitive ecosystems. The scientific data base
is similarly adequatefor the selection of effection emission
reduction strategies to reduce substantially the effects off acid
deposition."
p. 22. "Although in recent yearsthere has beena reduction in
total SO2emissions affecting Canada, what is significant is that
they remain near their historical peak."

p. 8. "The amount of SO emitted in 1983 represents a 28
percent decline from the peak level-28.7 million tons-emitted in 1973."

p. 22. "The emissions of the other main acid-causing gas, NO,
It is theCanadian perare continuing to rise significantly ....
ception that, unless additional measuressuch as the new Canadian reductionprogramwill be implemented, tbe totalemissions
of S02 affecting Canadawill increase into the next century.
NO, emissions will increase at an even higher rate."

the 1970sand
p. 9. "Total U.S. NOx emissions peaked during
then declined slightly. In 1979, U.S. NO emission totalled
21.1 million tons; by 1983they hadfallen to 19.3 million tons.
Between 1970and 1983 . . .overall, U.S. NO. emissions increasedby only sevenpercent."

[t]he U.S. government should implement a five-year, five-billiondollar control technology commercial demonstration program. The
federal government should provide half the funding-2.5 billion
dollars-for projects which industry recommends, and for which
industry is prepared to contribute the other half of the funding.248
The second set of recommendations concerns activities between Canada
and the United States in the areas of ongoing discussions, consultations,
and information exchange.249 The final groups of recommendations are
research oriented and focus on the development and deployment of standard, accurate methods to measure dry deposition; the development and
empirical testing of models for predicting watershed response to acid
deposition; and further study of biological damage from surface water
acidification, the potential link between forest decline and acid rain, the
effects of acid rain on materials, and the environmental toxicity of heavy
metals subject to mobilization, transport, and the flux in acidified surface
waters. 25" The central and critical feature of the Report is that no specific
targets or deadlines are set for reducing air pollution. As a result, the
248. Id. at 29.
249. Id. at 31-32.
250. Id. at 32-35.
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Report has drawn critical commentary from some American congressmen,
Canadian legislators, and Canadian and U.S. environmental groups.25
In essence, a fundamental disagreement still remains between the two
countries on the extent of the problem and the necessity for immediate
remediation. It is an immutable part of any natural resource issue that
there be an intimate linkage between scientific and political/policy factors.
What appears of concern to an external observer is the ambiguous direc-

tion of
causality in United States decisionmaking on the subject of acid
252
rain.
The Costs and Benefits of Environmental Control
The increasing pressure for deregulation in the United States and the

concern for issues of economic efficiency have prompted a more sophisticated analysis of the costs and benefits which accrue from alternative
environmental control strategies. The literature is replete with compelling
demonstrations of the savings to society inherent in the adoption of market
or quasi-market mechanisms for pollution control .253 The volume of Ca251. Report on Acid Rain Criticized for Failure to Include Deadlines, Globe & Mail, Jan. 8,
1986, at All, col. 1; Report on Acid Rain Fails to Set Targets for U.S. Reductions, Globe & Mail,
Jan. 8, 1986, at Al, col.5; U.S. Acid Rain Envoy Seeks Prompt Action on Report to Reagan, Globe
& Mail, Jan. 9, 1986, at A8, col.1; Joint U.S.-Canada Report on Acid Rain is Delivered, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 9, 1986, at B6(L) col. 1; Canadian Defends Acid Rain Report, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9,
1986, at B6(L), col. 4; and Report on Acid Rain Inadequate, MPs Say, Globe & Mail, Feb. 14,
1986 at A4, col.4.
252. For a more extensive discussion of the impact of political considerations on scientific deliberation, see Roberts, Acid Rain Clouds U.S. and Canadian Relations, 33 Biosci. 418 (July/Aug.
1983), reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ACID RAIN-A SURVEY OF DATA AND CURRENT
ANALYSES 448 (May 1984) (a report prepared for the use of the Subcomm. on Health and Environment
of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce). See also Acid Rain Debate Tells as Much About
Washington as Science, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1982, § Ill, at 3 col. 1; Acid Rain Issue Creates Stress
Between Administration and Science Academy, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1982, § 111, at 1, col. 3; Critics
of Reagan's Acid Rain Plan Hear Defense From Ruckelshaus, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1984, § I, at
8, col. 3; Legislators Say White House Suppressed Acid Rain Report, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1984,
§1, at 10, col.1.
253. See, e.g., J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES (1968); B. ACKERMAN & J. SAWYER,
THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: SCIENTIFIC FACTFINDING AND RATIONAL DECISIONMAKING ALONG THE DELAWARE RIVER (1972); ECONOMIC THINKING AND POLLUTION PROBLEMS
(D.Auld ed. 1972); S. MUSHKIN, PUBLIC PRICES FOR PUBLIC PRODUCTS (1972); A.C. ENTHOVEN &
A.M. FREEMAN III, POLLUTION, RESOURCES, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1973); D.N. DEWEES, C.K.
EVERSON & W.A. SIMMs, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES (1975); A.V. KNEESE &
C.L. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); R.W. JOHNSON & G. BROWN, CLEANING UP EUROPE'S WATERS (1976); ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
(OECD), POLLUTION CHARGES: AN ASSESSMENT (1976); FR. ANDERSON, A.V. KNEESE, PD. REED,
S. TAYLOR & R. B. STEVENSON, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES (1977);
THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES TO THE CONTROL OF POLLUTION: THE CASE

OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (J. Stephenson ed. 1977); W.J. BAUMOL & W.E. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE (1979); O.E.C.D., POLLUTION CHARGES IN PRACTICE
(1980); J.A. BUTLN, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY (1981);
INCENTIVES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (T. Schelling ed. 1983); and B.T. BOWER, R. BARRE,
J. KUHNER & C.S. RUSSELL, INCENTIVES IN WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT: FRANCE AND THE RUHR
AREA (1981).
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nadian research in this area has been significantly less, although several
major research efforts have been undertaken to reassess the conceptual
and practical issues in a broad range of regulatory problems.254 One
study, 255 based on work commissioned by the Economic Council of Canada, conducted a preliminary evaluation of toxic chemical regulation in
Canada. Ranges of costs and benefits supplemented by survey information, analogous American data, interviews, and case studies were used
to demonstrate the general usefulness of a cost-benefit framework for
public sector decisionmaking even when information availability is constrained and complete analysis is not feasible. It was concluded that, with
few exceptions, the impact of environmental regulation on chemical producers in Canada is neither excessive nor unduly onerous. 5 6 Clearly, this
only marks the beginning of this type of research effort and the conclusions, although convincing, do not preclude the opportunity for more
efficient regulation through the calculus of cost-benefit analysis.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There appear to exist a theoretical rationale and direct empirical evidence to justify the presence of both provincial and federal levels of
government in the domain of pollution control in Canada. 257 There is a
clear role for provincial governments because of their familiarity with
and responsibility for issues of local economic and environmental concern. Several parallel technical/economic developments have strongly
bolstered the case for a major coincident federal presence. First, increasingly integrated domestic and international markets may create perverse
incentives for both national and subnational jurisdictions to bid against
one another by offering a concessionary package containing less vigorous
environmental control regulations. While the resolution of the problem
of environmental concessions to attract industry at the international level
remains elusive, national control can be achieved through the existence
254. See ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, REFORMING REGULATION (198 1); THOMPSON, supra note
93; Dewees, supra note 93; Felske & Assoc., supra note 93; Victor & Burrell, supra note 93; N.
BANKES & A.R. THOMPSON, MONITORING FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK (1980); DORECY ET AL, supra note 87; C.D. HUNT
& A.R. LUCAS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION-ITS IMPACT ON MAJOR OIL AND GAS PROJECTS: OIL
SANDS AND ARCTIC (1980); J.G. Nelson, J.C. Day & S. Jessen, Environmental Regulation of the
Nanticoke Industrial Complex (Sept. 1980) (Econ. Council of Can. Working Pap. No. 7); P. Nemetz,
J.Sturdy, D. Uyeno, P. Vertinsky, A. Vertinsky & A. Vining, Regulation of Toxic Chemicals in the
Environment (Feb. 1981) (Econ. Council of Can., Working Pap. No. 20); G.A. Rohlich & R. Howe,
The Toxic Substances Control Act: Overview and Evaluation (Feb. 1981) (Econ. Council of Can.
Working Pap. No. 21); and J.Z. SWAIGEN, COMPENSATION OF POLLUTION VICrIMS IN CANADA (1981).
255. Nemetz, Sturdy, Uyeno, Vertinsky, Vertinsky & Vining, Toxic Chemical Regulation in
Canada:PreliminaryEstimates of Costs and Benefits, 25 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 405 (Fall 1982).
256. Id. at 419.
257. See supra note 119.
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of an active centralized authority. Second, the increasing level of resource
extraction and industrialization creates potentially significant environmental externalities at both the national and international levels. Again,
the capacity for the resolution of this problem seems, at least now, to be
higher at the domestic level, and such resolution is dependent upon a
centralized regulatory structure. Finally, the development of new, more
advanced technologies with their complex and uncertain risks to large
segments of the population warrant a federal presence for the generation
and dissemination of information, and the guarantee of an equitable and
consistent process of risk management throughout the nation.
Empirical evidence suggests that a federal legislative and regulatory
presence, as exemplified by the Fisheries Act, is an essential element in
the achievement of an effective system of environmental control in Canada
where provincial regulatory resources or will are weak. It is also possible
that policies of further devolution in the administration and enforcement
of such legislation could be potentially counterproductive and vitiate the
sound theoretical rationale for concurrent jurisdiction.
The Canadian system of environmental regulation provides, in many
respects, an interesting contrast to its American counterpart. While controlled experiments are not feasible on this scale, it is nevertheless possible
to deduce certain basic similarities in the nature if not scale of environmental problems in both countries due to a similar industrial structure
and long-standing economic, political, and social ties. The structure and
operation of environmental regulation in Canada has been marked by
several distinctive characteristics, most notably a flexible and consultative
approach with a remarkably low degree of overt acrimony, confrontation,
and legal prosecutorial activity, coupled with a low level of public scrutiny
and input. In theory, regulatory systems structured in this manner offer
the benefit of relatively efficient, expeditious, and effective environmental
control.
In practice, problems in enforcement and compliance tend to remain,
paralleling similar experience in the United States.258 In several areas of
258. U.S. GAO, INFORMATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S ENFORCEMENT
ACTIVITIES (Apr. 1, 1982) (CED-82-62); U.S. GAO, WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE NOT COMPLYING
witH EPA POLLUTION CONTROL PERMrrS (Dec. 2, 1983) (Report to the Administrator, EPA); U.S.
GAO, INSPECTION ENFORCEMENT AND PERMITTING ACTIrrVIES AT NEW JERSEY AND TENNESSEE HAZARDOUS

WASTE FACILITIES (June 22, 1984) (Report to Chairman, Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation
& Tourism, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, GAO/RECD-84-7); COMPTROLLER GENERAL,
U.S. GAO, EPA NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS OVERSIGHT OF AIR POLLUTION CONTROL GRANT EXPENDITURES

(Sept. 28, 1984) (Report to Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, House Comm.
on Energy & Commerce, GAO/RCED-84-163); COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. GAO, CLEARER EPA
SUPERFUND PROGRAM POLICIES SHOULD IMPROVE CLEANUP EFFORTS (Feb. 6, 1985) (GAO/RCED85-2); U.S. GAO, AIR POLLUTION: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S INSPECTIONS OF STATIONARY

SOURCES (Oct. 24, 1985) (Briefing Report to Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations,
House Comm. on Energy & Commerce) (GAO/RCED-86-IBR).
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recent public concern, such as drinking water safety and toxic waste
control, Canadian regulation appears to lag behind the United States.
While the costs associated with an adversarial model based on extensive
public participation are generally avoided, so are many of its benefitsparticularly the airing of diverse but legitimate views, the generation and
dissemination of extensive and relevant information, and a certain sense
of system legitimacy and acceptability to all interested parties through
the extensive utilization of democratic judicial and political mechanisms.
In fairness, neither the Canadian nor American system of environmental
regulation has achieved demonstrable levels of economic efficiency or
effectiveness, and the hope remains that some judicious blend of the more
desirable properties of both systems might lead to better solutions.

